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This report concerns the regulatory control of nuclear energy in 2000. Its submission to the Ministry of
Trade and Industry by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is stipulated in section 121
of the Nuclear Energy Decree. STUK’s regulatory work focused on the operation of Finnish nuclear
facilities as well as on nuclear waste management and nuclear materials.
The Finnish nuclear power plants were operated in compliance with current regulations. No operatio-
nal events occurred that would have endangered the safe use of nuclear energy. The operation of the
FiR 1 research reactor was uneventful as well. The doses of all nuclear power plant workers remained
below the individual dose threshold. The collective occupational dose was internationally compared low.
Radioactive releases were low as well the dose calculated on their basis for the most exposed individual
in the vicinity of Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants was well below the limit established by the
Council of State Decision. In addition, the occupational radiation doses arising and radioactive releases
into the environment from the research reactor were well below the set limits.
The regulatory control of nuclear waste management focused on spent fuel storage as well as on final
disposal plans and on the treatment, storage and final disposal of reactor waste. No events occurred in
nuclear waste management that would have endangered safety.
Nuclear material safeguards verified the use of nuclear materials in accordance with current regula-
tions and the whereabouts of every batch of nuclear material.
International co-operation continued, with financing from STUK’s budget and from external sources.
Externally financed co-operation focused on the improvement of safety and radiation protection at Kola
and Leningrad nuclear power plants as well as on the development of nuclear material control systems
in Ukraine, the Baltic Countries and Russia.
The total costs of the regulatory control of nuclear safety in 2000 were FIM 38.8 million and the income
was FIM 31.2 million. The total costs of operations subject to a charge were FIM 31.1 million, the full
amount of which was charged to the users of nuclear energy.
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According to the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987),
the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
(STUK) is vested with the duty to regulate the
safe use of nuclear energy in Finland. STUK's du-
ties also include the control of physical protection
and of emergency preparedness and the necessary
control of the use of nuclear energy to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
This is a report on supervision in the field of
nuclear energy that STUK provides to the Minis-
try of Trade and Industry once a year, as stipulat-
ed in section 121 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. In
the sector of the Ministry of Trade and Industry,
the general objective in the regulation of the
safety of nuclear power plants was that STUK is
active in a way that would prevent at Finnish
nuclear facilities accidents resulting in environ-
mental contamination. In addition, STUK was to
have a role in the drawing up of domestic research
programmes and to support the inclusion of Fin-
land's objectives in international research pro-
1 INTRODUCTION
grammes. A further objective in the regulation of
the safety of nuclear power plants was that STUK
is prepared for the safety regulation of a possible
new nuclear power plant project.
The general objective set for STUK in the field
of nuclear waste management in the sector of the
Ministry of Trade and Industry was that the
storage and final disposal of nuclear waste gener-
ated in Finland is safe. In addition, STUK was to
define what clarifications are necessary for evalu-
ation of the safety of a final disposal facility for
spent fuel based on the requirements of the Nucle-
ar Energy Act and the Council of State decisions
in principle.
The general objective in nuclear material regu-
lation and export control in the sector of the
Ministry of Trade and Industry was for STUK to
contribute to the development of nuclear material
and export control as part of EU control proce-
dures.
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Fig 1. Number of published YVL guides.
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By virtue of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987)
and the Council of State Decision (395/1991) on
the general regulations for the safety of nuclear
power plants, it is STUK's duty to prepare also
detailed safety regulations for nuclear facilities.
The YVL guides published by STUK serve this
purpose. The guides present safety requirements
for nuclear facilities and STUK’s regulatory proce-
dures. STUK decides, case by case, how new
guides apply to and bind those facilities already in
operation. In 2000 STUK issued 16 such decisions
(Appendix 3). YVL guides are available on STUK's
Web site (at www.stuk.fi).
The YVL guides were further revised and up-
dated. A considerable number of them, i.e. ca.
70%, are under revision or are being assessed for
their need of revision. In 2000 three guides were
published and several draft guides were prepared.
A decision was made to replace Guides YVL 6.11
and YVL 6.21 concerning physical protection with
separate STUK decisions in the future. The
number of Finnish-language guides published eve-
ry year is given in Fig. 1. Most of the guides are
available in English.
The need to change YVL guides due to renewed
pressure equipment regulations was assessed. Ac-
cording to the assessment, all guides pertaining to
pressure equipment are to be updated prior to 29
May 2002, the transition period expiry date of the
EU's pressure equipment directive.
YVL guides and other regulations essential for
nuclear safety control have been accessible, as a
separate Windows application Ydintieto, through
STUK's network for a few years already. The
application's data content was regularly updated.
Its conversion to a web-based format has been
started for integration in STUK's intranet.
2 REGULATORY GUIDES
No significant amendments to the Nuclear En-
ergy Act or Decree were passed in 2000. The
Nuclear Energy Act was amended on account of
changes made to the Model Protocol Additional of
the IAEA's Safeguards Agreement. The Nuclear
Energy Act, as amended, will take effect by a
decree to be given separately. STUK issued a
statement to the Ministry of Trade and Industry
about the future amendments to the Nuclear En-
ergy Decree.
STUK issued to the IAEA national statements
on seven draft safety guides (see Appendix 4).
In the autumn of 2000, a self-assessment was
launched, focused on two features of the YVL
guides: how much prescriptive guidance they in-
clude and what their coverage is. In addition, an
independent external study of the same subject
was commissioned to the Technical Research Cen-
tre of Finland (VTT). The IAEA's higher-level
regulations will be used as a reference in the self-
assessment. The VTT study is focused on the
mapping of the opinions and experiences of licen-
see representatives, to sketch a picture of how
potentially harmful they consider the prescriptive
nature of Finnish nuclear regulatory guides.
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3.1 Resources in nuclear safety
regulation
The regulation of nuclear safety was mostly fo-
cused on the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power units
owned by Fortum Power and Heat Oy and the
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 units owned by Teollisuuden
Voima Oy as well as on their nuclear waste man-
agement and nuclear materials. The planning and
later implementation of the final disposal of nucle-
ar fuel, which is part of nuclear waste manage-
ment, is taken care of by Posiva Oy. Subject to
regulation were also the research reactor operated
by the Technical Research Centre of Finland,
small-scale users of nuclear materials as well as
transportation of radioactive materials. This chap-
ter gives an overall account of the control exer-
cised by STUK, and statistics on the regulatory
activities. The above activities subject to regula-
tion are described in more detail in chapters 4, 5
and 6.
The duty area of nuclear safety regulation
included those basic operations subject to a charge
and those not. The basic operations subject to a
charge were comprised of the regulation of nucle-
ar facilities, with their costs charged to the licen-
sees. Those basic operations not subject to a
3 NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATION
charge included international and domestic co-
operation, public communication and emergency
response. The basic operations not subject to a
charge are publicly funded. The costs and income
of basic operations are described in subsection 3.7.
The costs of rule-making and those of support
functions (administration, development of the nu-
clear regulatory effort, training, maintenance and
development of expertise as well as reporting)
were included in the costs of basic operations and
of services, in relation to the number of working
hours spent on each function. Rule-making is
described in chapter one and some support func-
tions in subsections 3.3 and 3.6.
Table I gives the distribution of working hours
spent yearly on the various duty areas by staff
whose main task is nuclear safety regulation.
The time spent on the regulatory control of the
Loviisa nuclear power plant safety was 11.9 man-
years, which is 14.9% of the total working time of
the personnel. The time spent on Olkiluoto nucle-
ar power plant was 12.3% man-years, i.e. 15.5% of
total working time. Nuclear material safeguards
are included in these figures. The time spent on
nuclear waste regulation was 2.0 man-years, i.e.
2.3% of total working time. Fig 2 gives distribu-
tion of working time spent on the main functions.
Table I. Distribution by duty area of working hours spent on nuclear safety regulation.
raey-nam
aeraytuD 6991 7991 8991 9991 0002
egrahcaottcejbussnoitarepocisaB 0.62 1.92 7.42 3.52 4.62
egrahcaottcejbustonsnoitarepocisaB 1.5 4.4 6.4 5.5 5.7
secivreS 3.6 2.8 9.6 0.7 4.5
snoitcnuftroppusdnagnikam-eluR 5.72 8.32 1.52 6.42 5.52
ecnesbafosyaddnasyadiloH 1.31 7.41 9.31 8.41 0.51
latoT 0.87 2.08 2.57 2.77 8.97
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3.2 Operational inspections and
review
Operational inspections included periodic inspec-
tions and inspections that the licensee was obliged
to separately request in connection with measures
carried out at the facility, or that were conducted
by STUK at its discretion. In addition, STUK as-
sessed the safety of nuclear power plants i.a. on
the basis of operating experience, safety analyses
as well as reports and plans submitted by the
licensees, and by inspections onsite and at compo-
nent manufacturers' premises.
Inspections included in the periodic inspection
programme are given in Appendix 1 and topical
inspections in Appendix 2. Inspections in accord-
ance with the periodic inspection programme are,
as a rule, repeated every year; the contents of
individual inspections, however, may alter year by
year. The yearly inspection programme is brought
to the knowledge of the licensee at the beginning
of every year and the inspection days are agreed
upon with the licensee. The inspection programme
for the year 2000 included 16 inspections at Lovii-
sa plant and 17 at Olkiluoto plant. The manage-
ment, procedures, the work of organisational units
and the technical acceptability of systems were
looked into during these inspections. In connec-
tion with them, also walk rounds at the plant were
made to verify facts and to control, among others,
overall plant cleanliness and order. Two unan-
nounced inspections were conducted as part of the
programme. These inspections were carried out at
Loviisa nuclear power plant. The focus of the
inspections was on the ascertaining of the opera-
bility of components during outages, on the mark-
ing off of the components as isolated from process-
es, and radiation protection during outages.
Primary observations of the periodic inspection
programme at Loviisa and Olkiluoto facilities were
connected with the real-timeness and appropri-
ateness of plant instructions, life time manage-
ment and the identification of common cause fail-
ures. At Loviisa plant the observations were also
connected with radiation protection and at
Olkiluoto plant with organisation and personnel
training. The licensees already have, and they
will, carry out actions to remedy the observed
deficiencies. None of them would have essentially
affected the safety of the plant units.
The annual maintenance outages were over-
seen by STUK. Controlled were, among others,
administration of work performed during the out-
ages, activities of the operating and maintenance
personnel, refuelling, inspections and tests con-
ducted by the licensee and subcontractors as well
as radiation protection. STUK supervised also the
shutdown of the plant units and their startup
after the outages.
The number of inspection days onsite and at
the component manufacturers' premises totalled
569. In addition to inspections at nuclear power
plants, the figure also includes nuclear waste
management and safeguards inspections. Addi-
Fig 2. Working time spent on STUK's main functions.
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tionally, two resident inspectors worked at
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant and one at Loviisa
plant. The number of inspection days over the
past years is given in Fig 3.
The total number of documents submitted to
STUK for review in 2000 was 1455. The number of
documents submitted in 2000 and earlier, whose
review was completed, was 1274. The figure in-
cludes the licences granted by STUK in accord-
ance with the Nuclear Energy Act, which are
listed in Appendix 3, and the decisions pertaining
to nuclear power plant personnel that can be
found in Appendix 4. Average document review
time was 55 days. The yearly number of docu-
ments and their average review times are given in
Fig 4. Figs 5 and 6 give the distribution of review
Fig 3. Number of inspection days onsite and at component manufacturers' premises.
Fig 4. Number of documents received and reviewed as well as the average document review time.
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times for documents concerning Loviisa and
Olkiluoto plant units that were under review for
approval. Reports for 25 events at Loviisa nuclear
power plant and for six events at Olkiluoto nucle-
ar power plant were submitted to STUK. The
number of event reports over the past years is
given in Fig 7. The licensees regularly submitted
to STUK also the following reports: daily reports,
quarterly reports, annual reports, outage reports,
annual reports on environmental radiation safety,
monthly reports on individual radiation doses,
annual reports on operational experience feedback
and safeguards reports.
The regulatory control proved that the Finnish
nuclear power plants were operated in accordance
with valid regulations. Nuclear waste manage-
ment and the use of nuclear materials were in
compliance with valid rules and regulations. On
the basis of the inspections and reviews, addition-
al documentation and measures were requested
Fig 5. Distribution of time spent on preparing deci-
sions concerning the Loviisa plant units.
Fig 7. Number of event reports submitted by Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants.
Fig 6. Distribution of time spent on preparing deci-
sions concerning the Olkiluoto plant units.
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Fig 8. The costs of nuclear safety research.
from the utilities to further enhance the safety of
the plants.
3.3 Safety research
By means of research the safe use of nuclear ener-
gy is ensured and enhanced. STUK's experts con-
trolled and monitored the ongoing, publicly fi-
nanced FINNUS 1999–2002, a national nuclear
power plant safety research programme, and the
JYT 2001, a nuclear waste research programme.
STUK ordered the majority of research made into
nuclear power plant safety and waste manage-
ment from external organisations (VTT, Technical
Research Centre of Finland and GSF, Geological
Survey of Finland).
The research topics of the FINNUS 1999–2002
programme in 2000 were nuclear power plant
ageing, reactor accidents and various risks ana-
lysed in eleven research projects and numerous
subprojects and tasks. A interim report on the
FINNUS programme is available at http://
www.vtt.fi/ene/research/finnus/. The research
focus of JYT 2001 research programme in 2000
was the same as in 1999, that is geosciences,
engineered barriers, mitigation of radioactive sub-
stances, safety analyses and engineered solutions.
JYT 2001 also included societal research topics.
An interim report of JYT 2001 (in Finnish) is
available at http://www.vtt.fi/ene/tutkimus/
jyt2001/jytpvali.pdf. English summaries are
available at http://www.vtt.fi/ene/tutkimus/
jyt2001e. The JYT 2001 research programme cov-
ers the period 1997–2001.
Appendix 5 lists STUK-financed safety re-
search that was completed in 2000. Part of it
closely relates to nuclear safety regulation and is
kept separate from the FINNUS and JYT pro-
grammes. STUK's research programme includes
projects dealing with the development and assess-
ment of the procedures of the regulatory control.
The annual cost of nuclear safety research is given
in Fig 8.
For enhancement the utilisation of the results
of the international research co-operation of the
nuclear safety research and of other countries
with nuclear power plants in operation, STUK has
followed and participated in the co-operation in
question. Co-operation in its traditional forms has
continued through OECD, IAEA and EU working
groups and projects. In 2000 STUK participated in
safety research seminars arranged by the Swedish
nuclear safety authority (SKI) and Det Norske
Veritas. As a result, research reports of the
OECD's Halden project and by the US safety
authority NRC, among others, have become avail-
able to STUK. In addition, the use of the Internet
to monitor safety research has been significantly
intensified.
Publishing activities concerning nuclear safety
research were intensified by improving, among
others, the research information provided on
STUK's Web site.
STUK purchases most safety research projects
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from VTT. In order to assure the quality of re-
search and its independence, STUK commissioned
an audit of the quality systems of VTT's various
research units to an external consult.
3.4 Emergency response
STUK oversees the preparedness of the operating
organisations of nuclear power plants to act in
unusual situations and maintains its own emer-
gency preparedness. No such situations occurred
in 2000.
Emergency response at nuclear power plants
has been continuously developed during plant
operation and regularly tested in emergency exer-
cises as part of emergency preparedness training.
STUK has approved the emergency plans of Lovii-
sa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants and re-
views every year the implementation of the emer-
gency preparedness regime, including training
and emergency exercises.
STUK arranged several training events and
exercises to test and develop its emergency re-
sponse. Emergency training was also arranged for
experts from foreign authorities.
Various types of national emergency exercises
were arranged in Finland in 2000 the most exten-
sive of which was the VALHA exercise. Separate
exercises began in March. An exercise arranged
by the Council of State (VNH-2000) was held on
31 August 2000 and one involving local and dis-
trict administration (APH-2000) on 5–7 Septem-
ber 2000. Practically all authorities at central
administration level participated in the VALHA
exercise. District and local government as well as
numerous municipalities participated insofar as
the events concerned them. In STUK's field of
activity, two special situations were rehearsed: a
nuclear explosion in the Barents Sea and an
accident at Loviisa nuclear power plant. The high-
est number of STUK participants at one single
time was 26. Some worked in protected rooms,
some at STUK and some at Loviisa plant. Work-
ing under exceptional conditions was tested dur-
ing the exercise. An objective was also to test
management between central, district and local
administrations as well as co-operation between
authorities under exceptional circumstances. In
addition, recommendations pertaining to decon-
tamination and as well as questions relating to
agriculture and forestry were discussed.
3.5 Communications
STUK took the initiative in communicating to the
general public matters relating to safety, nuclear
waste management and safeguards at nuclear
power plants and also responded to questions
made by the media. STUK issued information of
over 20 different topics in the form of press releas-
es and bulletins on the Teletext pages of YLE (the
Finnish Broadcasting Company) and on its own
Web site. In addition, the various subjects were
discussed in the STUK publication ALARA that
comes out four times a year. The media were pro-
vided with quarterly reports on the use of nuclear
energy in Finland and in its neighbouring coun-
tries.
On STUK's Web site, under Reader's Link,
citizens can make questions to STUK's experts. In
2000, 137 questions were made two of which were
about nuclear safety regulation. Asked were how a
disposal facility for spent fuel would affect the
economy of host municipality and to what extent
radiation emanating from high-level reactor waste
would reduce with time.
Of the events at Finnish nuclear power plants,
a leak of mildly radioactive water on 17 August
2000, which recurred the next day, attracted the
most media attention. It was rated INES Level 1
because its recurrence. Information was also dis-
seminated about other matters relating to safety
regulation at Finnish plants, including the failure
of a sewage collection tank in the medium-level
waste storage onsite Olkiluoto plant, the annual
maintenance outages of the plant units, and a
brief production break for a repair work at Loviisa
2. In addition, a summary information bulletin
was issued in early 2000 about most significant
events at the Finnish plants. Information on spec-
ified requirements for application in the siting of
nuclear power plants was also announced.
As regards nuclear waste management, STUK
provided information about a preliminary safety
analysis report submitted to the Ministry of Trade
and Industry concerning Posiva Oy's application
S T U K - B - Y T O 2 0 8
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for a decision in principle on the final disposal of
nuclear waste; STUK also provided information
about its contribution to an international project
to develop methods for the final disposal of nucle-
ar fuel In addition, the safety assessment and
those safety requirements applied to a final dis-
posal facility for nuclear fuel were described to the
Economic and Environmental Committees of par-
liament during their visit to STUK on 7 June
2000. As regards nuclear material safeguards, a
summary report was issued on radioactive ship-
ments turned back at Finland's eastern border in
2000.
On 14 August 2000 STUK issued a press re-
lease about the possible radiation hazards of the
accident in the Barents Sea on 12 August 2000
that involved the nuclear submarine Kursk. Ac-
cording to the press release, even in the worst
case, the accident would not cause in Finland a
situation requiring protective measures. In con-
nection with the accident, rumours circulated
about elevated radiation levels in Finland. On 18
August 2000 a piece of news was broadcast in
Greece about high levels of radioactivity having
been measured in water in Finland and that they
were due to the Kursk accident. The rumour
might have been due to information simultane-
ously made public about a leak of mildly radioac-
tive water at Loviisa 1. The rumour was dispelled
on 18 August 2000 by a written announcement to
the IAEA, the EU and the Nordic Countries as
well as by a telephone call to the Greek radiation
authority.
In connection with projects to improve nuclear
safety in countries in Eastern Europe, information
was disseminated, among others, about new radi-
ation detection equipment that had been installed
at Tallinn Airport and also about training that had
been given to border control officers.
Information was published about issues relat-
ing to international co-operation, i.a. meetings
hosted by STUK, an assessment of STUK drawn
up by an IAEA group of experts (IRRT), and
nuclear safety in EU applicant countries. The
results of the IAEA assessment as well as the
report about nuclear safety in the EU applicant
countries were available in full on STUK's Web
site.
3.6 Development projects
Organisational culture
Co-operation and the flow of information have
been developed and working processes and roles
have been clarified in order to strengthen the or-
ganisational culture of the Nuclear Reactor Regu-
lation and to enhance work motivation. A survey
was conducted in 1999–2000 to determine the sit-
uation and to list the development needs; it in-
cluded, among others, interviews and a question-
naire. The results were processed in a seminar
that discussed matters relating to the depart-
ment's organisational culture. Five working
groups were formed to find out how people per-
ceive their work, in what way the results are as-
sessed and feedback given, and how expertise is
developed; also regulations, flexibility and values
were analysed. The department's operations will
be developed on the basis of the research results.
Data management
The Nuclear Reactor Regulation has launched a
long-term development project to clarify data
management relating to activities and processes
associated with nuclear regulatory control. All
data is currently contained in paper-based, local-
ised archives and in the form of digital data in
various databases, workstation hard disks and
STUK's server, which makes its retrieval for use
in decision-making or in the planning of inspec-
tions comparatively hard. Where data analysis or
the monitoring of matters under review are con-
cerned, the current data management facilities
fall behind modern standards. A great part of the
data remains undocumented, i.e. is in the form of
employee proficiency and know-how.
In 2000, data management was examined and
existing data archives were listed. During the
project, the modelling of working practices identi-
fied in nuclear regulatory control was started.
Also examined were the available software as well
as communication through electronic means be-
tween STUK and the licensees.
The storage and electronic retrieval of research
reports on nuclear waste management were devel-
16
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oped to improve the traceability of reports, among
others.
Development of safety control by means of
PSA
Risk-informed regulatory control assures that on-
site inspections and tests focus on objects essen-
tial to avoiding risks and that the prerequisites
for safe plant operation are in place. STUK has
extended risk-informed control by introducing new
applications, i.e. risk-informed inservice inspec-
tion of piping (RI-ISI), inservice testing of compo-
nents (IST), the Technical Specifications (TTKE),
and plant event risk follow-up.
A risk-informed in-service inspection programme
for piping
STUK has developed a risk-informed method for
drawing up an in-service inspection programme
for nuclear power plant piping. The objective is to
better focus inspections on objects having a bear-
ing on risk and to improve the periodic timing of
the inspections. The licensees contributed by pro-
viding the necessary information about systems
and materials, among others.
The piping inspections necessary in the shut-
down cooling system and in the sea water circuit
of the Olkiluoto plant units and in the high
pressure emergency cooling system and the back-
up emergency coolant system of Loviisa plant
have been analysed and the results are available.
Expert panels combined risk-informed and deter-
ministic data and specified the inspection priori-
ties of various piping segments. The panel identi-
fied some piping segments whose inspection pro-
gramme should be reassessed. The focusing of
inspections under the current inspection pro-
gramme was considered successful for the most
part.
Risk-informed assessment of the testing of safety
systems and components and of the Technical
Specifications
STUK's method analysis evaluated three regulato-
ry guides of the US regulatory authority USNRC,
pertaining to risk-informed Technical Specifica-
tions, plant modifications and testing. In addition,
STUK collected examples of relevant risk-in-
formed decisions made by itself or by Finnish pow-
er plants. Risk-informed methods showed that the
requirements contained in the Technical Specifi-
cations are not entirely mutually comparable. The
allowable repair time of some systems specified in
the Technical Specifications can lead to a ten-fold
risk compared to certain other significant safety
systems.
Risk-informed subsequent appraisal of plant
events
STUK developed a risk-informed plant event anal-
ysis method. The PSA based method is used to
assess the safety significance of incidents causing
component unavailability without a realised initi-
ating event. The results are utilised for example
in regulatory work and in the assessment of onsite
inspection focus. During 2000 this method has
been made more specific, further clarifying as-
sumptions and boundary conditions relating to
computation. Along with this analysis, applica-
tions have been drawn up containing an analysis
of the 1995–2000 plant events.
Nuclear material monitoring devices
As part of an IAEA support programme, STUK
has contributed to the development of new, effec-
tive methods of nuclear material verification. By
tomography, even one single rod missing in a fuel
assembly can be detected. The previous measure-
ment campaign was in Olkiluoto in December
1999. The next one will be at Ringhals nuclear
power plant in 2001.
In addition, STUK has developed new data
transfer methods for use by the IAEA in remote
monitoring. Monitoring data collected by the IAEA
can, in principle, be inexpensively transmitted via
the Internet but uncrypted data transmission is
problematic as regards data confidentiality and
authenticity. VPN (virtual private network), new
data security technology, offers a solution to this
problem. VPN was submitted to a 6-month field
test, utilising a connection from a STUK roof
laboratory to the IAEA headquarters.
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Fig 9. Nuclear regulatory control income and costs.
3.7 Finances
STUK has introduced a system of net budgeting
as of the beginning of 2000, whereupon the costs
of regulatory control of nuclear facilities subject to
a charge are directly entered as income to STUK.
In 2000, the costs of nuclear regulatory control
subject to a charge were FIM 31.1 million. The
total costs of nuclear regulatory control were FIM
38.8 million. The share of activities subject to a
charge was 80%.
The 2000 income from regulatory control was
of nuclear facilities was FIM 31.2 million. Of this,
FIM 12.9 million and FIM 14.7 million came from
the regulatory control of Loviisa and Olkiluoto
nuclear power plants, respectively. The control of
Posiva Oy's operations yielded FIM 3.5 million.
The income from other objects of regulation was
FIM 0.1 million. Figure 9 gives the annual income
and costs of regulatory control of nuclear facilities
over the recent years.
3.8 The Advisory Committee On
Nuclear Safety
In accordance with section 56 of the Nuclear Ener-
gy Act, the preliminary preparation of matters re-
lated to the safe use of nuclear energy is vested
with the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety.
The Council of State appoints the Committee that
functions in conjunction with STUK. Its term of
office is three years. The Committee was reap-
pointed on 16 August 2000 and its term of office
will end on 15 August 2003.
The new Committee's Chairman is Professor
Pentti Lautala (Tampere University of Technolo-
gy) and its Vice-Chairman is Head of Research
Rauno Rintamaa (Technical Research Centre of
Finland). The members of the Committee are
Senior Researcher Riitta Kyrki-Rajamäki (Techni-
cal Research Centre of Finland), Professor Ulla
Lähteenmäki (MIKES), Director Olli Pahkala
(Ministry of the Environment), Professor Rainer
Salomaa (Helsinki University of Technology) and
Branch Manager Paavo Vuorela (Geological Sur-
vey of Finland). Professor Jukka Laaksonen, Di-
rector General of STUK, is a permanent expert to
the Committee. Invited experts are Dr. Antti Vuo-
rinen and Director Christer Viktorsson of the
Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate. The Com-
mittee convened seven times in 2000; three of the
meetings were by the new Committee.
For preparatory work, the Committee has set
up a Reactor Safety Division, a Nuclear Waste
Division as well as an Emergency Preparedness
and Nuclear Material Division. In addition to the
Committee members proper, distinguished experts
from various fields have been invited to the Divi-
sions.
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4.1 Loviisa nuclear power plant
4.1.1 Operation
Both units of Loviisa nuclear power plant operat-
ed reliably. The load factor of Loviisa 1 was 84.8 %
and that of Loviisa 2 was 91.0%. The duration of
the annual maintenance outages was 44 days at
Loviisa 1 and 19 days at Loviisa 2. The course of
the outages and the actions taken during them are
described in sub-section 4.1.2.
In addition to the annual maintenance outage,
there was a brief interruption in electricity gener-
ation at Loviisa 2 to repair a leaking valve in the
feedwater line of the secondary circuit; there were
no other interruptions in electricity generation at
Loviisa 1. No scrams occurred at either plant unit.
Due to a reduction in electricity demand, power
generation was reduced at Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2.
The power reductions took place around Easter
and May Day as well as in May–July. Consequent
production losses were 0.90% at Loviisa 1 and
1.8% at Loviisa 2. Production losses due to equip-
ment failures were 0.1% at Loviisa 1 and 0.2% at
Loviisa 2.
The Loviisa plant units had no computer-relat-
ed problems on Y2K critical days, i.e. 29 February
2000 and 1 March 2000, or during the crossover
from December 31, 2000 to January 1, 2001. No
significant problems occurred either during the
crossover from December 31, 1999 to January 1,
2000. STUK had required the licensee to prepare
for possible computer problems caused by the
dates in question and to report any deviations in
computer operation.
Figure 10 gives the daily average gross powers
of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant units in 2000.
Load factors and reactor scrams over the past
years are given in Figures 11 and 12.
4.1.2 Annual maintenance outages
The Loviisa 1 refuelling and maintenance outage
was from 22 July until 4 September 2000 and that
of Loviisa 2 from 28 August until 14 September.
Reactor refuelling as well as maintenance of com-
ponents, structures and systems were carried out.
In addition, plant modifications were made relat-
ing to severe accident management. Those plant
modifications most important to plant safety are
described in sub-section 4.1.6. Radiation safety
during the outages is described in sub-section
4.1.8.
The annual maintenance of Loviisa 1 was about
two weeks longer than planned. This was mostly
due to the unplanned identification and repair of
leaks in an emergency make-up tank. The 1000 m3
volume tank contains boric acid water to be inject-
ed to the primary circuit during an accident.
During the outage the tank's leak detection line
indicated a ca. 10 litres/h leak from the tank.
Inspections revealed several defects in the tank's
steel cladding, some of them penetrating the clad-
ding. Defects and leak points were repaired and
cladding samples were taken for detailed labora-
tory analysis. Startup was delayed in its early
stages because the primary circuit had to be
cooled down from warm-up to repair a steam line
isolation valve.
STUK oversaw the annual maintenance outag-
es. It gave permission for Loviisa 1 startup on 4
September 2000 and for Loviisa 2 startup on 14
September 2000. The licensee initiated the start-
ups after STUK's inspectors had ascertained star-
tup readiness onsite. Loviisa 1 started electricity
generation on 4 September 2000 and Loviisa 2 on
14 September 2000.
4 REGULATORY CONTROL OF
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Fig 10. Daily average gross power of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant units in 2000.
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Fig 12. Number of reactor scrams at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto units, scram tests excluded
(reactor power exceeds 5%).
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4.1.3 Significant operational events
No event at the Loviisa plant units endangered
safety in 2000. The highest level assigned to them
was INES Level 1. A leak of mildly radioactive
water during the Loviisa 1 annual maintenance
outage was assigned Level 1 because its recur-
rence. The number of events at INES Level 1 and
above at the Finnish plant units is given in Fig 13.
The lowering of an activity monitor's alarm
limit was delayed at Loviisa 1
During the functional testing of activity monitors
at Loviisa 1 on 9 February 2000, the sensitivity of
a monitor that checks the secondary circuit for
radioactive off-gases was found inadequate. The
plant unit's Technical Specifications require its re-
pair within eight hours. If this is not possible, the
monitor's alarm limit must be lowered.
A work order was written to repair the monitor.
Information about the work order did not reach
the shift manager according to procedures, for
him to have ordered the lowering of its alarm
limit. Repair work began the next morning and, at
the same time, this breakdown in communication
was discovered. The monitor's alarm limit was
immediately lowered, ca. 14 hours late.
The secondary side of the Loviisa plant nor-
mally contains no radioactive substances. Poten-
tial primary-to-secondary leaks are monitored for
radioactivity in various process phases by activity
monitors. On the day of the event, the monitors
were in operating order with the exception of the
non-sensitive monitor measuring the radioactivity
of off-gases. The delay in the lowering of the alarm
limit was of a brief duration and of minor signifi-
cance.
The licensee informed STUK about the event
in the daily report of 11 February 2000 and later
sent STUK a report about it and about measures
planned to prevent recurrence. In consequence of
the event, the licensee emphasises accuracy in the
processing of work orders and the importance of
informing about different matters. The event was
rated Level 0 on the INES scale.
A ventilation system disturbance in the
instrumentation area of Loviisa 1 control
building
On 19 April 2000, a cooling unit of the cooling
water system of the Loviisa 1 control building ven-
tilation system stopped due to a recirculating
pump bearing failure. The reserve cooling unit did
not automatically start because the pump motor
safety switches were in an incorrect position. The
plant unit was operating at full power. The Tech-
nical Specifications require the plant unit's shut-
down in two hours if both cooling units are una-
vailable.
When the cooling unit in operation had
stopped, its reserve unit was assumed to have
automatically started as usual. About half an hour
later, on examination of alarms received in the
control room, both cooling units were observed to
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have stopped. Ventilation system fans in the in-
strumentation area had automatically started at
full speed. However, due to a temperature control
system failure, the room temperatures had not
decreased as designed and the control room re-
ceived an alarm when the temperature in one
room exceeded 24 degrees. A reserve fan was
started to decrease the temperatures and the
alarm signal disappeared in 30 minutes. The re-
serve cooling unit was started in about two hours
from the start of the event. The recirculating
pump of the cooling unit that had been in opera-
tion was replaced whereafter the device was
brought back to operation.
The temperatures in the instrumentation area
during the event did not exceed the limits of the
Technical Specifications and the cooling units
were simultaneously unavailable for less than two
hours. The cause of the incorrect position of the
safety switches of the cooling unit's motor re-
mained unclear, as did the unit's time of inopera-
bility.
Owing to the event, the interval of testing
applied to the ventilation system of the control
building's instrumentation area was stepped up
and the control of the systems' availability was
increased.
The licensee identified the event's safety sig-
nificance based on the later analyses and in-
formed STUK on 2 June 2000. Later in June it
submitted a detailed report and what measures
were planned to prevent recurrence. The event
was assigned Level 0 on the INES Scale.
Primary circuit temperature measurement
at Loviisa 2 was simulated to a protected
state in violation of the Technical
Specifications
Loviisa 2 was in power operation on 10 August
2000 when a primary circuit temperature meas-
urement was found to display values in excess of
actual temperatures. The plant unit's Technical
Specifications require the repair of failures of this
kind within three days. Unless the measurement
function can be restored to operation within that
time period, the plant unit must be brought to hot
stanby for the repair.
It was found out the next day that the failure
could not be repaired within the period allowed for
restricted operation. The measurement was thus
simulated to a protected state, i.e. a state where a
measurement value would actuate its protective
function. The procedure as such is appropriate
and complies with the Technical Specifications of
Loviisa 1. At the time of the event, a correspond-
ing change to the Technical Specifications of Lovii-
sa 2 was under review by STUK and the simula-
tion was not yet an approved procedure. The
licensee should have submitted to STUK, as a
separate matter, this deviation from valid Techni-
cal Specifications. STUK has approved the change
to the Technical Specifications on 13 September
2000.
The event surfaced during a periodic inspec-
tion conducted by STUK. It had no bearing on
plant safety but the licensee's failure to closely
follow administrative procedures, as required by
STUK, was considered a deficiency. The event is
rated Level 0 on the INES Scale.
A fresh fuel assembly sustained damage at
Loviisa 1
On 15 August 2000, while fuel was being loaded
into the reactor of Loviisa 1 during annual main-
tenance outage, defects were detected in the lower
end piece of a fuel assembly. It was a fresh fuel
assembly and no radioactive substances could be
released from the rods. The damaged assembly
was replaced in the reactor.
The damage sustained by the assembly was
discovered when its insertion during loading
failed, leaving it ca. 20 cm higher than other
assemblies. An inspection conducted by a TV cam-
era showed three dents in the assembly's lower
end piece that had prevented full insertion into
the reactor. Nothing out of the ordinary was found
in the attempted insertion position in the reactor.
Investigation revealed marks in the rack for inter-
nal transfer of fuel assemblies indicating that the
assembly's lower end had hit the rack at an above-
normal speed. After this the licensee considered it
unnecessary to look for the cause of the damage
inside the reactor and replaced the assembly with
a fresh one. The damage sustained by the assem-
bly prevents its further use in the reactor.
The dents had occurred during the lifting of the
assembly from the storage pool. In the pool the
assemblies are submerged in water in a transfer
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rack in which they are brought from the fresh fuel
storage and from which they are transferred one
by one by the refuelling machine to the reactor.
The gripper of the refuelling machine had failed to
grip the assembly. This was found out and the
gripper was to be lifted up and the procedure was
to be attempted again. The gripper had stuck onto
the assembly, however, which started to be lifted
along with the gripper, but fell from ca. 25 meters'
height to the bottom of the rack. During the grip's
lifting, insufficient attention was paid to the dis-
play of the weighing machine and it thus went
unnoticed that the assembly was being lifted along
with the grip. Under the transfer rack was a
dosemeter, which had fallen into the storage pool,
to which the event was attributed. It had caused
the rack and the fuel assemblies therein to be-
come slightly askew. During the lifting of assem-
blies, scratches on the gripper had increased as-
sembly by assembly. During the lifting of the last
assemblies, the one in question being among
them, the gripper's scratches were so numerous
that it failed to close and lock.
Refuelling guidelines are under review by the
licensee. In case a gripper's attachment to a fuel
assembly must be corrected, specific attention is
to be paid to the readings of the scale's display
and to the entering of the figures displayed on the
refuelling's list of actions.
The licensee on 16 August 2000 notified STUK
of the event and, later in the month, submitted a
detailed report about it. In November it submitted
a report about causes. The event was classified
Level 0 on the INES Scale.
Leaks of mildly radioactive water during
Loviisa 1 annual maintenance outage
Two leaks of mildly radioactive water occurred
during the annual maintenance outage of Loviisa
1. The first occurred on 17 August 2000 during the
emptying of an emergency cooling water tank. The
tank contains non-radioactive boric acid water and
was being emptied for inspections. The filling
pump of the reactor pool was used whose suction
line filled with air and prevented the pump's use.
The suction line's refilling was attempted with
mildly radioactive water from the reactor pool. Af-
ter the filling, air was to be removed from the
suction line and the pump's operation was to be
tested.
The filling of the line was started by opening
the isolation valves of a line coming from the
reactor pool, which is not a regular operation. The
control room staff on shift was not aware that an
isolation valve in a line branching out from the
main line was open when it should have been
closed. The isolation valve had been opened in
connection with a lowering of the reactor pool
level, which procedure had been entered in the
operating logs of the shift manager and of the
reactor operator. Directly after the opening of the
valves, water began to leak from the reactor pool
via the open isolation valves outside the contain-
ment to rooms in the lower part of the reactor
building.
The leaked water's temperature was ca. 30
degrees and it immediately triggered fire alarms.
The leak was not detected at once because, in
accordance with instructions, focus was placed on
clarifying the fire alarms. The leak was noticed in
about ten minutes from the receipt of the fire
alarms and the open valve was closed. The water
leak was ca. 20 m3 in volume. The rooms affected
have thresholds as well as floor drains designed
for handling water leaks and radioactive water.
The ventilation system of rooms located in the
lower part of the reactor building, whose filters
remove potential radioactive substances from air,
was put on the filtering mode in about two hours
after the event. Some unfinished maintenance
work on the ventilation system prevented the
filtering function's immediate activation.
Areas affected by the mildly radioactive water
were isolated or marked out. Their activity con-
centrations were determined. The surface contam-
ination measurement average of the most contam-
inated room was ca. 70 kBq/cm2. Appropriate
protective equipment were used when making the
measurements and during decontamination.
Workers received insignificant radiation doses
from these measures. The collective radiation dose
arising from the decontamination was ca. 2
mmanSv, which was only a minor part of the
combined dose (collective dose 1670 mmanSv, see
Fig.17) incurred from work done during the Lovii-
sa 1 annual maintenance outage. After decontami-
nation had been completed, the surface contami-
nation of the rooms was below the limiting value
of 4 Bq/cm2, i.e. their activity concentration had
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been restored to pre-leak level.
The next day, i.e. on 18 August 2000, the
reactor pool extraction pump test was continued.
The pump was started without first checking the
entire pipeline included in the pump start-up.
Immediately after the pump's start-up, water be-
gan to discharge through the recirculation lines of
the emergency cooling system to rooms inside the
containment building. The leak volume was ca. 10
m3. The leaked water did not contain the same
radioactive nuclides that caused heavy surface
contamination during the previous day's leak. The
surface contamination of the leak area varied,
maximum contamination being ca. 7 Bq/cm2. The
radiation exposure of workers during the decon-
tamination did not deviate from those incurred
during regular decontamination. The decontami-
nation restored pre-leak activity concentration in
the rooms.
The licensee informed STUK about the leak
without delay and also sent in September a de-
tailed description of the events and of the meas-
ures planned to prevent recurrence. The latter
event was classified Level 1 on the INES Scale
because this was a second occurrence.
In consequence of the events, the licensee re-
viewed and further specified the instructions for
plant unit operation. In addition, it defined meas-
ures for those exceptional situations during annu-
al maintenance outages not covered by proce-
dures.
During post-leak decontamination it was found
that the paintwork on the steam generator room
floor was peeling. It was repaired during the
annual maintenance outage. STUK requested
from the licensee an analysis of how reactor cool-
ing during an accident would be affected by the
peeling. An analysis and experimental data
showed that even the largest estimated amount of
fine-grained, peeling paint would not substantial-
ly clog the plant's cooling water filters.
Back-up emergency feed water pump out of
operational readiness in violation of the
Technical Specifications of Loviisa 2
A pump of the back-up emergency feed water sys-
tem shared by the Loviisa plant units was out of
operational readiness in violation of the Technical
Specifications. The situation occurred when the
pump's servicing was started during the annual
maintenance outage of Loviisa 1. Its out-of-service
time is unlimited for a shutdown plant but during
operation the pump must be serviced in 21 days.
Work on the pump was started on 31 July 2000
and was finished on 22 August 2000. The allowa-
ble out-of-service time was exceeded by 43 hours.
The back-up emergency feed water system as-
sures injection of water to the secondary side of
the steam generators in case the operation of feed
water pumps and emergency feed water pumps
have been prevented by a turbine hall fire, for
example. The system was installed in 1990 and
comprises two diesel-operated pumps shared by
the two plant units. The pumps inject water to the
steam generators of either plant unit.
Progression of this work, as well as that of
other work during which plant operation is re-
stricted, was monitored at Loviisa 2. Owing to
human error, the pump's maintenance was
thought to have been completed and monitoring of
the work was discontinued before its actual com-
pletion. Loviisa 1, responsible for the pump's
maintenance, did not apply the period of limited
operation that was in use at Loviisa 2. The pump's
maintenance and testing were delayed due to
other urgent outage work.
The licensee noticed only later that the time
allowed for the pump's removal from operating
readiness had been exceeded at Loviisa 2. It
notified STUK about the matter on 25 August
2000 and in September sent STUK a detailed
report on the event as well as a plan for measures
to prevent recurrence. The exceeding of the allow-
able time of removal from operating readiness was
of a brief duration and the event was thus as-
signed Level 0 on the INES Scale.
Concentration of boric acid in primary
circuit water exceeded threshold limit at
Loviisa 1
During a test conducted towards the end of the
annual maintenance outage, the boric acid concen-
tration of the primary circuit of Loviisa 1 exceeded
the limit given in the Technical Specifications. The
excess concentration was insignificant and lasted
18.5 hours.
In addition to control rods inserted into the
reactor, boric acid assures reactor subcriticality
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during outages. The Technical Specifications state
that the boric acid concentration is to be 13–14 g/
kg of coolant during outages. The lower limit is so
set that reactor subcriticality is maintained even
if the control rods were withdrawn. The upper
limit is set on the basis of the corrosion impact of
the boric acid. The boric acid concentration is
monitored by continuous-operation measurement
and laboratory analyses. It is reduced during
plant startup and during the operating cycle.
The allowable boric acid concentration was
exceeded on 3 September 2000 during a testing of
the plant unit's primary circuit make-up system.
During the test, water containing strong boric
acid solution is injected into the primary circuit.
The test is conducted once a year, usually immedi-
ately after the plant unit has been stopped for
annual maintenance. During the test, strong boric
acid solution is injected into the primary circuit to
increase its boric acid concentration to a value in
compliance with the Technical Specifications. Due
to a make-up system pump failure, however, the
test had been moved to the startup phase.
The plant unit was in a post-revision hot stand-
by state at the time of the event. The next phase
in plant startup is startup state during which the
reactor is made critical by dilution of the boric
acid concentration of the primary circuit. It would
have required the unlocking and restoration,
while in hot standby, of the clean water feed lines
in use during outages. The licensee therefore
decided to move on to the next startup phase
where the reduction of the primary circuit's boric
acid concentration is begun according to normal
procedures.
The exceeding of the allowable boric acid con-
centration of the primary circuit water was minor
and did not adversely affect the fuel cladding. The
event was affected by the make-up system test
having been conducted, exceptionally, during plant
unit startup. A shortcoming in the procedures
followed by the licensee was that STUK's permis-
sion was not asked for the non-reduction of the
boric acid concentration while in hot standby state
and for the carrying out of the reduction in the
next plant startup phase, i.e. startup state. The
licensee informed STUK about the event on 6
September 2000 and sent a detailed report in
September. The event was rated INES Level 0.
Partial inoperability of the sea water clean-
up system of Loviisa 2 during annual
maintenance outage
It was noticed at Loviisa 2 on 8 September 2000
that the sea water clean-up system was not fully
operational in accordance with the Technical Spec-
ifications. The situation lasted for 18 hours. The
plant unit was undergoing annual maintenance.
The sea water clean-up system comprises two
parallel subsystems, with two lines to the turbine
condensers in each. Before they reach the con-
densers, water is taken from the four lines for
injection to the plant unit's service water system
that cools the cooling circuits of systems and
components important to safety, among others. It
is essential that, during outages, the sea water
system contains no impurities that could endan-
ger the operation of the service water system. One
sea water clean-up system line must be operation-
al during outages.
One subsystem of the sea water system had
been removed from service for maintenance and
the filter baskets in one line of another subsystem
were being replaced. The control room on 6 Sep-
tember 2000 authorised the inspection and repair
of a filter in the operational line. The work was
started on 8 September 2000; the filter was isolat-
ed from the sea water line and emptied. During
the isolation as well as the issuance of the work
permit, it went unnoticed that the replacement of
the filter baskets in the other line had not yet
been completed. According to original plans, it
should have been completed by the time in ques-
tion; however, the work was behind schedule. The
filter in the second line was available, with the
exception of the its back flushing function.
The back flushing function's unavailability was
observed during inspections made before switch-
ing from refuelling shutdown to cold shutdown.
The filter of the first line was easily made opera-
tional and measures were immediately taken to
return it into service.
The sea water was relatively clean at the time
of the event and the filter of the other line was in
place. Had the sea water contained impurities,
from a storm for example, the filter would have
very slowly become clogged because of the sea
water system's large volume and the small flow
into the service water system. The service water
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system's cooling capacity thus was not significant-
ly endangered.
The licensee informed STUK about the event
without delay and in September submitted a de-
tailed report about it. It was classified Level 0 on
the INES Scale.
4.1.4 Event investigation
STUK appoints a team to investigate into a plant
event especially when the licensee’s organisation
has not operated as planned or when an event is
assessed to lead to significant modifications in the
plant's technical structure or instructions. A
STUK investigation team is set up also if the li-
censee has not investigated an event's root causes
well enough.
The licensees assess events that have occurred
at their plants, taking action, if necessary. STUK
assesses these licensee measures as part of safety
regulation. STUK also assesses its own activities
in connection with the events.
In the year 2000 STUK investigated the below
two events:
Deviations from the Technical Specifications
The number of plant operations in violation of the
Technical Specifications in 1999, as compared to
the previous years, had increased both at Loviisa
and Olkiluoto plants. They have been described in
the report STUK-B-YTO 202. Common causes un-
derlying these events as well as causes that may
have contributed to their increase were looked
into.
No unambiguous common denominator for the
increase was found. The process of defining events
as being in violation of the Technical Specifica-
tions had been observed to be open to interpreta-
tion, which could have had a bearing on their
increase. For example, an event used not to be
considered in violation of the Technical Specifica-
tions if the plant situation was brought to comply
with the requirements within a fixed period of
time from the detection of a failure or a situation.
At present an event is considered to be in non-
compliance with the Technical Specifications if it
has passed unobserved in tests required in the
Technical Specifications.
Plant events violating the Technical Specifica-
tions generally involve underlying human and
organisational factors. The most significant com-
mon denominator is management of situations
involving change. The progress of five events into
events in violation of the Technical Specifications
has been essentially affected by changes in origi-
nal plans and an insufficient consideration of
changes in the replanning of work. The investiga-
tions have not revealed any shortcomings in the
clarity of the Technical Specifications, or how well
they are known or understood.
Shortcomings in the operating and mainte-
nance instructions have been noted to have a
bearing on the initiation of several events. The
utilities have already implemented software modi-
fications to correct the situation. During its own
inspections STUK should pay attention specifical-
ly to the quality of the utilities' maintenance
instructions in all fields of technology.
On the basis of the investigation, the utilities
should re-evaluate their current procedures for
recognising change. They should also find out how
to avoid excessive routine and how to foster alert-
ness of action, especially when pressed for time
and during abnormal situations. In consequence
of the events, the utilities have further developed
procedures for validating system and component
operability.
Delays and deficiencies in implementing of a
risk reducing modification at Loviisa
nuclear power plant
An investigation was made into a delay in the
implementation of a modification to assure the
injection of sealing water to cool the seals of the
primary coolant pumps of Loviisa nuclear power
plant. Mechanical seals require continuous cool-
ing. If cooling is lost for several hours the seals
could sustain damage leading to a small leak from
the primary circuit. The importance of cooling wa-
ter supply and its enhancement have been recog-
nised based on the results of probabilistic safety
analyses (PSA), among others. PSA results have
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shown that the loss of primary coolant sealing
water significantly contributes to core melt risk,
especially in case of the loss of the sea water sys-
tem, among others.
The seals are cooled by primary coolant, which
is cooled by water from the intermediate coolant
circuit. The intermediate coolant circuit is cooled
by water from the service water system. A service
water system leak occurred at Loviisa 1 in 1998
and during its isolation a disturbance was caused
in the operation of the intermediate cooling cir-
cuit. The temperature of the sealing water of the
primary coolant pumps consequently increased,
exceeding the limit set in the operating procedure
(STUK-B-YTO 202, 2000).
The planned upgrade makes possible the cool-
ing of the seals by water from the boric acid
system. The system's water is cold enough to
make its separate cooling unnecessary. Sealing
water injection would be automatically switched
to occur from the boric acid system if sealing
water temperature exceeds 50 degrees. The me-
chanical seals of the primary circulation pumps
withstand temperatures up to 70–80 degrees. The
upgrade requires modifications to the protection
and control systems as well as new temperature
measurements.
The licensee had made a modification initiative
in summer 1998 and a preliminary work plan was
ordered the next year. The licensee decided to
implement the modification in June 1999. It was
due at Loviisa 2 in the annual maintenance out-
age of 2000. In spring 2000 STUK approved sys-
tem pre-inspection documentation submitted by
the licensee. In July the licensee submitted to
STUK for approval pre-inspection documents for I
& C systems. STUK reviewed them in August.
The licensee informed STUK that, since it had not
received STUK's approval of the documents in
time, there would not be enough time to carry out
the modification in the outage.
Investigation revealed shortcomings in the ac-
tions of both the licensee and STUK. One impor-
tant reason for the licensee's belated accomplish-
ment of plans was postponement of implementa-
tion decisions. The modification's implementation
was put off because the time and human resources
spent in its planning were insufficient and the
number of necessary analyses was underestimat-
ed. In addition, the design criteria for the seals
were insufficient and the seals' actual endurance
had not been verified. The pre-inspection docu-
ment for I & C systems included unjustified defi-
ciencies from the regulatory requirements con-
cerning the temperature measurements compo-
nents.
Aware of the shortcomings, the licensee sub-
mitted the documents to STUK, assuming that
STUK would approve them. A stringent schedule
may have had a bearing in the matter.
STUK's review of the documents was belated
because they arrived late and were reviewed dur-
ing overlapping Loviisa 1 outage which was de-
layed by two weeks. There was not sufficient
awareness of the modification's importance within
STUK. In addition, STUK did not manage the
entire modification in a centralised manner.
Regulatory procedures relating to modifica-
tions are under review by STUK to eliminate the
shortcomings. In the co-ordination of extensive
modifications important to safety, projects and
early monitoring are to be preferred. The licensee
is to ensure that, in the planning of modifications,
the requirements of regulatory guides are ob-
served and any deviations thereof justified.
4.1.5 Deviations from the Technical
Specifications
The following five events, involving plant unit
non-compliance with the Technical Specifications,
occurred at the Loviisa plant units:
• The lowering of the alarm limit of an activity
monitor was delayed at Loviisa 1
• A ventilation system malfunction occurred in
the Loviisa 2 control building instrumentation
room
• A back-up emergency feed water pump was not
in operational readiness at Loviisa 2
• The allowable boric acid concentration of pri-
mary circuit water was exceeded at Loviisa 1
• A partial inoperability of the sea water clean-
up system of Loviisa 2 during the annual
maintenance outage.
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Fig. 14. Number of onsite situations in violation of the Technical Specifications at Loviisa and Olkiluoto
nuclear power plants.
Fig. 15. Number of exemptions from the the Technical Specifications at Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear
power plants.
Number
Number
Detailed descriptions of the events can be found in
subsection 4.1.3.
The licensee has planned and partly imple-
mented measures to prevent recurrence. Fig. 14
gives the number of plant events in violation of
the Technical Specifications over the past years.
The Technical Specifications were deviated
from also when the licensee applied for STUK's
advance approval of a deviation. In the year 2000,
STUK granted a total of six such exemptions for
the Loviisa plant units; one application was
turned down. The yearly number of exemptions is
given in Fig. 15.
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4.1.6 Safety improvements
Mitigation of the consequences of severe
accidents
In the Loviisa 1 annual maintenance outage of
2000, a number of measures to mitigate the conse-
quences of severe accidents were implemented.
The measures are part of the facility's ongoing
project providing for severe accidents. Of the ac-
tions taken, the technically most far-reaching was
the implementation of plant modifications re-
quired by the reactor pressure vessel's external
cooling. For this purpose, flow routes between the
steam generator room and the reactor pit were
opened and configured; the lowering equipment of
the reactor pressure vessel's heat shield was also
fitted in place. STUK oversaw the modifications
and the associated site acceptance tests. After the
completion of these modifications, the hot corium
melt that would form in a severe accident could be
contained inside the reactor pressure vessel by
externally cooling the vessel.
A separate control room for severe accident
management, to be shared by the two units, was
given the finishing touches. In addition, a number
of modifications to automation technology was
made and new I & C systems were installed,
enabling centralised severe accident management.
Among others, a manual trip alternative was
provided for the actuation of special containment
isolation signals necessary to maintain contain-
ment tightness. These manually tripped special
functions assure containment tightness against
possible leaks through systems.
Hydrogen is released inside the containment in
severe accidents. For its burning in a controllable
manner, and to avoid quick explosive hydrogen
burns, the installation of catalytic recombiners in
the containment has been planned as well as the
installation of opening mechanisms for the doors
of ice condenser compartmet located inside the
containment. The opening mechanisms assure
supply of air to all parts of the containment
because air is needed in the catalytic burning of
hydrogen. In addition, they also limit local hydro-
gen concentrations, making flaming unlikely. Both
systems were due for installation at Loviisa 1 in
2000; however, their installation has lingered due
to technical problems. Installation of the opening
mechanisms of ice condenser doors was started
during the annual maintenance. Work will contin-
ue both during operation and in the 2001 annual
maintenance outage.
Removal of water seal cross-tie lines from
the primary circuit of Loviisa 1
Water-seal cross-tie lines adjoining the primary
circuit were removed at Loviisa 1 during the an-
nual maintenance outage. This small-diameter
piping was located in three of the plant unit's six
loops between bends in the cold and hot legs of
primary piping. The cross-tie lines were fitted in
the early 80's when the so called water seal phe-
nomenon was assumed to compromise reactor core
cooling during a primary circuit leak. Current
knowledge, based on experimental investigation
and analyses, considers the cross-tie lines unnec-
essary. Their removal eliminated the possibility of
a primary circuit leak through them.
The primary circuits of the Loviisa plant units
have bends both in the hot leg leaving the reactor
and the cold leg returning to the reactor. After the
commissioning of the plant units, the bends were
considered a possible safety hazard for reactor
cooling in certain primary circuit leak situations.
It was estimated, that a minor leak in the cold leg
would cause a long-term drop in the reactor water
level, which would partially expose the fuel and
leave it without sufficient cooling. According to
these analyses, when steam generated in the
reactor flows to the leak point, it suppresses the
reactor water to the level of the upper edge of
primary circuit piping bends. Analyses indicated
that this harmful phenomenon was made worse
by two successive bends. With the calculation
methods available it was demonstrated that when
the bends of a loop's hot and cold legs are connect-
ed using relatively small-diameter piping, the
drop in the reactor water level caused by the
water seal phenomenon is reduced to a level not
hazardous for reactor cooling. Three loops at both
Loviisa plant units were fitted with cross-tie lines.
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Cracks have been detected in the cross-tie lines
and their valves, two of which have developed into
small leaks into the containment. Because of the
risk of a leak from the piping and their valves as
well as the work load arising from their condition
monitoring, the licensee investigated how neces-
sary the cross-tie lines are in the light of current
knowledge. After the lines were installed in the
80's, the water seal phenomenon of the reactor
primary circuit has been quite extensively investi-
gated. At the same time, the applicability and
reliability of analysis methods have been im-
proved. According to studies conducted by the
licensee, the cross-tie lines only have a minor
effect on the water seal phenomenon, which, even
at its worst, is much milder than was estimated
possible at the time of the lines' design.
STUK reviewed and approved documents sub-
mitted by the licensee for justification of the
removal of the cross-tie lines, reviewed plans for
the removal of the lines and the devices contained
therein as well as supervised the work at Loviisa
1. Corresponding modifications will be made at
Loviisa 2 in the 2002 annual maintenance outage.
Renewal of low pressure emergency coolant
pumps
In the 2000 annual maintenance outage of Loviisa
1, two pumps of the low pressure emergency cool-
ing system were replaced and the necessary pip-
ing modifications were made.
The low pressure emergency cooling system
cools the reactor during emergencies. The system
is divided into two parallel, independent subsys-
tems with two parallel pumps (four pumps in all)
in each. Either independent subsystem can alone
handle the cooling function during an accident.
Only one subsystem's pumps were now replaced.
The replacement pumps had proved necessary
due to some structural weaknesses found in the
old pumps. In connection with it, it was also
possible to improve the reduction of mechanical
stresses exerted on the pumps from the piping.
The new pump type exceeds the original in effi-
ciency, and the modification thus also improved
the capacity of the low pressure emergency cool-
ing system. STUK reviewed and approved the
modification plans and supervised the pre-opera-
tional testing of the pumps. Plans are to install
new pumps to the other Loviisa 1 subsystem and
to the two Loviisa 2 subsystems in the year 2002.
Measures taken on account of elevated
steam generator room temperatures
Based on temperature measurements made in the
steam generator rooms of the Loviisa plant units
it has been ascertained that, over the past years,
the electrical and I&C components and cables lo-
cated there have been exposed during operation to
thermal loadings in excess of design basis values
(STUK-B-YTO 190, 1999). High temperatures and
radiation levels accelerate cable and component
ageing.
The faster-than-expected ageing of the cables
led to extensive cable inspections and replace-
ments at both Loviisa plant units in the 1999
annual maintenance outages. In the annual main-
tenance outages of 2000 further measures were
implemented in the steam generator rooms to
assure the operability of the electric and I & C
cabling and to reduce the temperatures. Further
temperature measurements were made to identify
items that might require upgrading. Electric and I
& C cables were inspected both visually and by
cable sample examinations. Cabling was replaced
and installations were upgraded. Lighting plus
their cabling in the steam generator room were
replaced. Some aged thermal insulation of piping
and of other hot structures was replaced and, on
the basis of temperature measurements, addition-
al insulation was installed to reduce heat emis-
sion from hot structures to the surrounding spac-
es. A reduction in the steam generator room tem-
peratures during operation was aimed at by im-
proving the efficiency of the ventilation systems.
This has given added assurance of the availa-
bility of electric and I & C components and cables
needed during possible accident conditions. The
licensee has also updated a condition monitoring
programme assuring the long-term operability of
the electric and I & C components located in the
steam generator room. The upgrading measures
in the steam generator room will be continued in
future annual maintenance outages.
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STUK inspected and approved all upgrades
made on account of high steam generator room
temperatures. In addition, STUK oversaw imple-
mentation of the upgrade projects in the 2000
annual maintenance outages.
Improvement of the temperature endurance
of emergency coolant pumps at Loviisa
facility
Safety analyses in connection with the modernisa-
tion and power uprating of Loviisa facility showed
that the temperature endurance of the motors of
containment spray system pumps needed upgrad-
ing. The motors' availability during a possible
long-term undervoltage needed to be improved as
well. The pumps spray the containment with wa-
ter in the event of a large loss-of-coolant accident.
As a result of the analyses the licensee decided
to modernise the electric motors of containment
spray system pumps at both plant units. The
modernisation was carried out by rewinding the
old electric motors plus their auxiliary motors.
The motors now meet more stringent require-
ments pertaining to operating and ambient condi-
tions. The rewinding of the motors was started in
1999 and was completed in early 2000 at what
time the last rewound pump motor was returned
to service.
STUK has reviewed and approved documents
relating to the renewal of the motors and super-
vised the installation of the motors and their pre-
operational testing.
4.1.7 Probabilistic safety analyses
Flood risk analysis
STUK has reviewed a flood risk analysis for Lovii-
sa nuclear power plant that was updated in 1998.
The previous flood risk analysis report of 1994
was reviewed by STUK in 1997. Flood risk analy-
sis deals with flood events internal to the plant
during power operation that could arise from tank
and piping ruptures or component malfunctions,
for example. The flood risk assessment for power
operation is ca. 5% of assessed plant core melt
frequency.
Flood events internal to the plant during out-
ages are dealt with in outage risk analysis; floods
due to external events are included in weather
risk analysis. Certain flood events affect the adja-
cent plant unit as well. The analysis for Loviisa 1
includes such Loviisa 2 flood events.
The licensee has listed potential sources of
flooding by comparing the location of components
and systems important to safety to those of sys-
tems containing significant liquid volumes; also
flood pathways were considered. After an onsite
inspection in 1994, the licensee listed nine flood-
initiating event groups. Flooding is caused by
piping or tank ruptures, erroneous pump startups
or incorrect valve positions, for example. Flood
risk is strongly affected by the location and isola-
tion of flood sources and, on the other hand, of
components important to safety, particularly those
needed in the removal of reactor decay heat.
The goal of the 1997 flood risk analysis by
STUK was to assure that all potential sources and
routes of flooding had been identified and that the
effect of flooding on the functioning of the plant's
safety systems had been appropriately evaluated.
In addition, the objects and sufficiency of future
modifications to reduce flood risk were evaluated.
The new review by STUK of the 1998 flood risk
analysis complemented the 1997 review because
the licensee had made numerous changes to the
1994 version. A new flood-initiating event and the
impact of a feed water tank level flooding, among
others, had been included in the analysis; plant
modifications were taken into account as well.
4.1.8 Radiation safety
The radiation doses of those who worked at Lovii-
sa nuclear power plant in 2000 were below the 50
mSv annual limit. The distribution of individual
doses in 2000 is given in Table II. The highest
individual dose at Loviisa nuclar power plant was
18.4 mSv. It accumulated during the annual main-
tenance outages of Loviisa 1 and 2. The highest
individual dose incurred in the Loviisa 1 annual
maintenance outage was 16.5 mSv and that in-
curred in the Loviisa 2 outage was 7.9 mSv. Radia-
tion doses may not exceed the dose limit of
100 mSv over any period of five years. The highest
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Dose range Number of persons
(mSv) by dose range
Loviisa Olkiluoto total*
< 0.5 245 394 577
0.5–1 113 228 325
1–2 124 224 325
2–3 83 121 192
3–4 52 58 104
4–5 28 42 70
5–6 29 26 55
6–7 22 7 33
7–8 24 12 45
8–9 18 4 33
9–10 14 6 29
10–11 8 4 16
11–12 10 3 17
12–13 3 1 7
13–14 8 – 11
14–15 6 1 9
15–16 2 – 4
16–17 6 – 6
17–18 4 – 5
18–19 2 – 2
19–20 – – –
20–25 – – –
> 25 – – –
* The data in these columns also include Finnish
workers who have received doses at Swedish nuclear
power plants. The same person may have worked at
both Finnnish nuclear power plants and in Sweden.
Table II. Occupational radiation dose distribution
at Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant units in 2000.
individual dose to a Finnish nuclear power plant
worker in the 5-year period 1996–2000 is
93.2 mSv.
The collective occupational radiation dose for
both Loviisa plant units in 2000 was 2.26 manSv.
The collective occupational doses incurred over
the past years are given in Fig. 16. The yearly
collective dose is mostly incurred in outage work.
The collective dose arising from work done during
annual maintenance outages is 1.67 manSv at
Loviisa 1 and 0.47 manSv at Loviisa 2. Figure 17
gives the collective occupational radiation doses
incurred during the annual maintenance outages
of the Loviisan plant units. The 2000 collective
dose at Loviisa 1 exceeds that of the previous
years owing to more scheduled work than usually,
to unscheduled work and an extended annual
maintenance. According to guidelines set by
STUK, the threshold guideline for the collective
dose for a Loviisa plant unit is 1.22 manSv aver-
aged over two successive years. In 1999 the collec-
tive occupational dose was 0.80 manSv at Loviisa
1 and 0.56 manSv at Loviisa 2. The guideline
value for two successive years was thus exceeded
by 0.04 manSv at Loviisa 1. In a case such as this,
the licensee must report to STUK what caused the
value to be exceeded and any measures that may
be needed to enhance radiation safety.
Radioactive releases into the environment from
Loviisa nuclear power plant in 2000 were well
below authorised limits. The releases of gaseous
radioactive effluents were 0.03% of authorised
limits. In the releases of radioactive noble gases,
the activation product of argon-40, i.e. argon-41,
originating in the air space between the reactor
pressure vessel and the biological shield, dominat-
ed. The releases of radioactive iodine were below
the detection limit. The tritium content of liquid
effluents, 11 TBq, is ca. 7% of the release limit.
The total activity of other radionuclides in liquid
effluents was 0.1 GBq, i.e. ca. 0.01% of the release
limit. Detailed information about the releases are
given in Table III.
The purpose of the release limits is to keep
annual individual exposure in the vicinity of nu-
clear power plants, arising from the operation of
the plants, well below the 100 µSv threshold value
given in the Council of State Decision (395/1991).
The dose to the most exposed individual in the
environment of the nuclear power plants, calculat-
ed on the basis of releases, was ca. 0.06% of the set
limit. Calculated annual radiation doses are given
in Fig. 18.
Radiation monitoring in the environment of
nuclear power plants comprises onsite and offsite
radiation measurements as well as the determina-
tion of radioactive substances to establish the
population radiation exposure and radioactive
substances present in the environment.
In the vicinity of Loviisa nuclear power plant,
324 samples were analysed in accordance with a
monitoring programme. Radioactive substances
originating in Loviisa plant were measurable in
one sample of air, six samples of deposition, one
sample of bottom fauna, 11 samples of aquatic
plants, seven samples of sinking matter and five
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Fig 17. Occupational radiation doses incurred in the annual maintenance outages of the Loviisa plant
units.
Fig 16. Collective occupaational doses at Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants.
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Gaseous effluents by nuclide group (Bq) a)
Plant site Noble gases Iodines Aerosols Tritium Carbon-14
(Krypton-87 (Iodine-131
equivalents) equivalents)
Loviisa
In 2000 5.4 ·  1012 5.7 ·  103 6.2 ·  107 2.0 ·  1011 2.8 ·  1011
Olkiluoto
In 2000 3.0 ·  1011 7.9 ·  107 1.3 ·  107 4.6 ·  1011       b)
Annual release limits
Loviisa 2.2 ·  1016 c) 2.2 ·  1011 c)
Olkiluoto 1.8 ·  1016 1.1 ·  1011
Liquid effluents by nuclide group (Bq) a)
Plant site Tritium Other nuclides
Loviisa
In 2000 1.1 ·  1013 1.0 ·  108
Olkiluoto
In 2000 1.0 ·  1012 1.1 ·  109
Annual release limits
Loviisa 1.5 ·  1014 8.9 ·  1011 c)
Olkiluoto 1.8 ·  1013 3.0 ·  1011
a) The unit of radioactivity is Becquerel (Bq): 1 Bq = one nuclear transformation per second.
b) The carbon-14 release-estimate based on experimental data was 7.6 · 1011 Bq in Olkiluoto in 2000.
c) The numerical value shows the release limit for the plant site by nuclide group assuming that other releases would
not occur. The total release limit is calculated so that the sum of the various types of release limit shares does not
exceed 1.
Table III. Measured radioactive releases from Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants in 2000.
samples of sea water. Cobalt-60 was a dominating
plant-based radionuclide measured in all of the
aforementioned samples, except for the air sam-
ple. The total number of observations was 25. The
next most common radioactive substances were
the radioactive isotopes of manganese and silver
(silver-110m, 16 observations and manganese-54,
12 observations). In some samples from the aquat-
ic environment, also the following radioactive sub-
stances were detected (the number of observations
in brackets): tritium (5), chromium-51 (1), cobalt-
58 (7), strontium-89 (1), zirconium-95 (1), nio-
bium-95 (2), tellurium-123m (3) and antimony-124
(5).
All the detected concentrations were low and
have no bearing of radiation exposure.
Radioactive isotopes of strontium, caesium and
plutonium (strontium-90, caesium-134 and 137,
plutonium-238,239 and 240), originating from the
Chernobyl accident and the fallout from nuclear
weapons tests, are still measurable in environ-
mental samples. Natural radioactive substances
(i.a. beryllium-7, potassium-40 and uranium and
thorium with their decay products) are also de-
tected whose concentrations in the samples in
question are usually higher than those of radionu-
clides originating from power plants or fallout.
Dosemeters measuring external radiation have
been placed in the environment of Finnish nuclear
power plants, in about 20 locations within a radi-
us of 1–10 km from the plants as well as 25
continuously operating measurement stations
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Fig 18. Radiation dose estimates calculated for an individual of the most exposed population group in the
vicinity of Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants.
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within a 5-km radius from the plants. The meas-
urement data yielded by the stations are trans-
ferred both to the plants' control rooms and the
national radiation monitoring network. Monitor-
ing is complemented by dose rate verification
measurements and spectrometric measurements.
In the environment of Loviisa plant, 12 such
measurements verifying external radiation were
made.
4.2 Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
4.2.1 Operation
Both units of Olkiluoto nuclear power plant oper-
ated reliably. The load factor of Olkiluoto 1 was
95.7 % and that of Olkiluoto 2 was 95.5%. The
duration of the annual maintenance outages at
both plant units was 14 days. The measures taken
during the outages are described in subsection
4.2.2. Radiation safety during the outages is de-
scribed in subsection 4.2.8.
No reactor scrams or other interruptions in
electricity generation occurred at the plant units.
Reactor power was limited in consequence of elec-
tricity demand. There were power limitations at
Midsummer and consequent production losses
were 0.2% at Olkiluoto 1 and 0.3% at Olkiluoto 2.
Production losses caused by component malfunc-
tions were 0.1% at Olkiluoto 1 and 0.04% at
Olkiluoto 2.
No problems occurred at the Olkiluoto plant
units on the days critical for computer software,
i.e. 29 February 2000 and 1 March 2000. On the
working day following the turn of the year 2000/
2001, a computer running an administrative soft-
ware application failed to start because it did not
recognise the year 2001 during startup. Other
computers of the same type failed in the same
manner. The computer type in question can be
found in certain process computer systems of the
Olkiluoto plant units; the problem did not surface
in them because they are never turned off. The
problem was corrected and the computers' opera-
tion was tested. No other problems occurred at the
turn of the year 2000/2001. Some minor problems
at the turn of the year 1999/2000 were reported,
the most significant of which was that the reading
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devices of the real-time dose monitoring system
were left on local operation mode. This hampered
the use of dosemeters. STUK had requested the
licensee to make provision for computer problems
that might be caused by the dates in question and
to report any deviations in computer operation.
Fig. 10 gives the daily average gross powers of
the plant units in 2000. Load factors and the
number of reactor scrams over the past years are
given in Figs. 11 and 12.
4.2.2 Annual maintenance outages
The Olkiluoto 1 refuelling and maintenance out-
age was from 21 May to 4 June 2000 and that of
Olkiluoto 2 from 7 to 21 May 2000.
It was waited at Olkiluoto 1 for 17 hours after
reactor shutdown for the reactor water radioactiv-
ity to decrease enough to allow for the opening of
the reactor. The higher-than-normal concentra-
tion of radioactive substances in the water was
caused by two leaking fuel assemblies in the
reactor. During the plant unit's startup after the
1999 annual maintenance outage on 25 July 1999
the licensee had detected a small nuclear fuel
cladding leak (STUK-B-YTO 196, 1999). Activity
monitoring during plant operation had indicated
another fuel leak later. The leak was located to
two fuel assemblies in a test prior to the reactor
shutdown. They were removed from the reactor
during the annual maintenance outage. Other fuel
assemblies were subjected to leak detection to
assure that no leaking fuel was left in the reactor.
Despite the fuel leak, the concentration of radioac-
tive iodine isotope (iodine-131) in the reactor cool-
ant water had been less than one part per thou-
sand of the threshold value given in the Technical
Specifications for the entire operating period and
since the previous annual maintenances; the val-
ue indicates when restrictions on reactor opera-
tion are necessary. The plant units have systems
for radiation detection and decontamination for
use in the event of fuel leaks.
In addition to refuelling, plant structures, sys-
tems and components were serviced during the
annual maintenance outages.
At both Olkiluoto plant units, unplanned addi-
tional work was caused by the repair of emergency
coolant system piping located inside the reactor
pressure vessel. By means of the piping, cooling
water is channelled to the upper plenum during
accidents. In inspections conducted at both plant
units in 1998 and 1999 (STUK-B-YTO 184, 1999
and STUK-B-YTO 196, 1999), cracks had been
detected in the piping. In 1999 cracked piping was
removed and replaced with new pipe segments
fitted with heat shields. Piping with no cracks in it
was fitted with heat shields only. Shifting of some
of the new piping segments plus their heat shields
was detected. Their proper positions were re-
stored and their attachments improved. The re-
paired piping segments will be checked every year
because of the risk of loose parts and thermal
fatigue.
STUK oversaw the annual maintenance outag-
es. STUK gave permission to start Olkiluoto 2 on
18 May 2000 after which STUK's inspectors ascer-
tained the plant unit's startup readiness onsite
the same day. The licensee began plant startup,
which had to be discontinued twice. In the early
stages of startup it was detected that a valve in
the relief system was leaking. Plant startup was
resumed after the valve had been repaired but it
had to be discontinued when another valve in the
same system failed to operate according to design
in a periodic test. The fault was repaired and the
plant unit was connected to the national grid on
21 May 2000.
STUK gave permission to start up Olkiluoto 1
on 2 June 2000. The licensee began startup after
STUK's inspectors had ascertained the plant
unit's startup readiness onsite. The plant unit was
connected to the national grid on 4 June 2000 and
was operating at full power on 7 June 2000.
4.2.3 Significant operational events
None of the events at the Olkiluoto plant units in
2000 endangered safety. The most significant
plant operating events and related regulatory
measures by STUK are described below. The
number of INES Level 1 and above events at the
Finnish plant units is given in Fig 13.
The volume of back-up diesel fuel in a
storage tank went below the limit set in the
Technical Specifications
It was found out at Olkiluoto 2 on 30 January
2000 that the volume of back-up diesel fuel in a
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storage tank was below the 230 m3 limit of the
Technical Specifications. For about two days, it
was 2 m3 below the minimum volume of the Tech-
nical Specifications. The amount of fuel had de-
creased during a diesel generator test.
Every operating shift checks and records the
amount of fuel in the storage tank. The morning
shift of 28 January had recorded 230 m3 as the
amount of fuel left and the evening shift had
recorded 228 m3. The morning shift did not notice
that the fuel level was approaching the level of the
Technical Specifications and the evening shift did
not notice that it had gone below it. The amount of
fuel recorded by the next four shifts was identical
(228 m3); the fact that the fuel level had decreased
below authorised level went unnoticed. In a week-
ly checking, on 30 January, it was detected that
the fuel level in the storage tank had decreased
from 242 m3 to 228 m3 during the week, and that it
was below the limit of the Technical Specifica-
tions.
Both plant units have four diesel generators
generating reserve power for the plant units in
case the off-site power is lost. The plant unit was
operating at full power in this case and there was
no need to start the diesel generators. The 230 m3
of fuel in the storage tank suffices for seven days
of generator operation, which has been a criterion
in the plant's design. In addition to the storage
tank, the diesel generators have their own day
tanks, with ca. 4 m3 fuel in each. The total amount
of fuel would have lasted for seven days of opera-
tion.
The licensee informed STUK about the event
in a daily report sent on 31 January 2000 and
later submitted a report on it and the measures
planned to prevent its recurrence. The deficien-
cies most significant for safety were found in limit
value monitoring. The fuel level was below the
limit of the Technical Specifications several times,
unnoticed. This was because the measurement
values recorded had not been compared with the
set limit. That the limit value went undetected
was because circulating written lists are used in
the monitoring of the diesel fuel level and because
the limit values are not automatically monitored.
As a result of the event, the limit values were
marked on the indicators. The licensee will also
look into the modernisation of monitoring. The
event was rated Level 0 on the INES Scale.
A liquid sewage collection tank broke at
Olkiluoto
It was detected on 17 January 2000 that the liquid
sewage collection tank of the medium-level waste
storage onsite the Olkiluoto facility, i.e. the KAJ
store, was leaking. The leak was detected during the
tank's yearly emptying during which sewage from the
tank is sucked into a transport container and taken
to the facility's liquid sewage treatment unit.
In the KAJ store, radioactive waste and compo-
nents are treated and temporarily stored. The 3
m3 fibreglass tank was located beneath the floor of
the storage, at ca. 1.5 meters' depth. It contained
sewage from the storage building's sinks and floor
washing water.
The tank was dug up and the radioactivity of
the surrounding soil was measured. Ca. 5 m3 of
sand in the tank's immediate vicinity was mildly
contaminated. No radioactivity in excess of natu-
ral background radiation was measured in core
samples taken in the environment of the area.
The contaminated soil was placed in drums
and handled as radioactive waste in accordance
with regulatory guidelines. Plans are to replace
the tank with a new one. Until that, a movable
tank will be used.
The licensee reported the event to STUK. It
had no bearing on the radiation safety of the
personnel or the environment and was classified
Level 0 on the INES Scale.
The connectors of boards in the neutron flux
monitoring system had been incorrectly
installed at the Olkiluoto plant units
Two unnecessary trippings of one reactor scram
condition were observed at Olkiluoto 1 in 1999.
Both took place during a periodic testing of the
neutron flux monitoring system. No reactor
scrams occurred since only one of the system's
four channels was tested at a time. The two trip-
pings were attributed to errors made during the
installation of the receptacle connectors for elec-
tronics  boards.
The neutron flux monitoring system of the
reactor of Olkiluoto 1 was upgraded in 1997 and
that of Olkiluoto 2 in 1998. The system, which
uses programmable technology, trips the scram
condition when the neutron flux exceeds a certain
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limit. All of the system's four channels have an
electronics board with traditional hard-wired tech-
nology, to assure the functioning of protection
limits that have been implemented using pro-
grammable technology. An unsuitable type of con-
nection sleeve had been used in the assemblage of
receptacle connectors on the back of the boards. In
addition, the installation method was incorrect
and the connecting wires were too thick. The
incorrect installations caused a contact distur-
bance during testing and tripped a scram condi-
tion during the detachment of the testing device's
connector from an electronics board. The problem
was detected in periodic tests in 1999 after the
boards to be inserted into receptacle connectors
had been replaced with a card type having im-
proved protection functions.
The installations at both plant units were cor-
rected in the annual maintenance outages of 2000.
During the outages the licensee also checked oth-
er connections in the neutron flux measuring
system and ascertained them to be in order.
STUK reviewed the repair plan and work as
well as documents containing the inspection re-
sults. The event has been assigned Level 0 on the
INES Scale.
A heater in the off-gas filtering system of
Olkiluoto 1 was isolated for preventive
maintenance in violation of the Technical
Specifications
A heater in the off-gas filtering system of Olkiluo-
to 1 was isolated for preventive maintenance dur-
ing power operation on 26 July 2000, which is
against the Technical Specifications. The heater is
allowed to be unavailable during plant operation
for three days owing to a failure but it may not be
removed from service for maintenance. It was iso-
lated for about three hours for calibration of the
temperature detectors of its electrical heating ele-
ments.
The heater is located in the auxiliary ventila-
tion section of the off-gas filtering system that
contributes to the emergency ventilation function
of the control building. The auxiliary ventilation
section comprises four parallel sets of filters and
four fans. The filter sets consist of a drop separa-
tor, a heater as well as particle and active carbon
filters for separating mechanical impurities, io-
dine and methylic iodide. Air is warmed up before
it enters the set of filters because humidity im-
pairs the mechanical endurance of particle filters
and reduces the separating capacity of active
carbon filters.
Analyses by the licensee and STUK have ascer-
tained that in 1999 all heaters of the off-gas
filtering system of Olkiluoto 1 had been isolated in
a corresponding way, in violation of the Technical
Specifications. There have been brief isolations
even on earlier occasions to allow for the measur-
ing of the insulation resistance of heating resis-
tors and the calibration of overheating protection.
These isolations have been of minor safety signifi-
cance only. The last event has been assigned Level
0 on the INES Scale.
The licensee informed STUK about the preven-
tive maintenance of the heater in a daily report of
27 July 2000. STUK's resident inspector investi-
gated the matter onsite and the licensee launched
an investigation into these recurrent deviations
from the Technical Specifications. The investiga-
tion attributed the event to both established prac-
tice and the inambiguity of the Technical Specifi-
cations. To prevent recurrence the licensee will
amend the Technical Specifications and instruc-
tions. It also listed some preventive maintenance
procedures applied to other systems, which could
be against the Technical Specifications. A need to
alter one preventive maintenance procedure was
identified.
4.2.4 Event investigation
In 1999 the number of situations in violation of
the Technical Specifications increased at Olkiluoto
facility, as compared with the previous years. An
investigation was conducted into the underlying
common factors and their causes; both Loviisa and
Olkiluoto nuclear power plants were looked into.
The results are described in subsection 4.1.4.
The investigation at the Olkiluoto plant units
also focused on common cause failures based on
human error whose number was on the increase
in comparison with the previous years. A common
cause failure is a failure in mutually parallel
subsystems, or their components, that is attribut-
able to one cause. The following, among others,
were considered human errors: design errors as
well as incorrect working methods and installa-
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tions. The investigation utilised the failure data-
base of Olkiluoto nuclear power plant.
The aim was to find out why the number of
events is growing and to assess the common cause
analysis method used by the licensee as well as
the way common cause failures have been consid-
ered in the plant units' probabilistic safety analy-
ses (PSA).
These common cause failures have been of
minor significance for the facility's operation since
none of them have been assessed to have any
bearing on plant operation. From the viewpoint of
system operation, three failures had no signifi-
cance, three would have resulted in incomplete or
incorrect system operation (mostly measurement
errors) and three rendered two or more subsys-
tems unavailable.
The investigation showed that the growth in
common cause failures was, at practical level,
caused by the same reasons that had increased
plant situations in violation of the Technical Spec-
ifications (subsection 4.1.4). From the viewpoint of
common-cause failure analysis it was noted that,
where PSA is concerned, the modelling of human-
error based common-cause failures is particularly
demanding. Operating experience from one facili-
ty is not sufficient to make a reliable database;
world-wide data gathering is needed.
4.2.5 Deviations from the Technical
Specifications
Two events occurred at Olkiluoto during which
the plant unit's state was in violation of the Tech-
nical Specifications:
• The volume of back-up diesel fuel in the stor-
age tank
• Isolation of a heater in the off-gas filtering
system for preventive maintenance at Olkiluo-
to 1.
Descriptions of the events are given in subsection
4.2.3.
The licensee has planned, or has already im-
plemented, measures to prevent recurrence, as
described in subsection 4.2.3. Fig. 14 gives the
number of plant situations in violation of the
Technical Specifications over the past years.
The Technical Specifications were deviated
from by virtue of exemptions granted by STUK. In
2000 STUK granted five such exemptions for the
Olkiluoto plant units; two applications were re-
fused. The yearly number of exemptions is given
in Fig. 15.
4.2.6 Safety improvements
Provision for severe accidents
Several projects in provision for severe accidents
(STUK-B-YTO 202, 2000) have been pending at
both Olkiluoto plant units. Of these, those planned
to the containment spray system were due for im-
plementation in 2000. After their completion, the
addition of lye to the spraying water during an
accident will be possible to prevent evaporation of
radioactive iodine from the containment pools.
This is to ensure that no radioactive iodine es-
capes to the environment in connection with a
containment pressure reduction, for example.
STUK approved the documents for the modifica-
tion in early 2001, whereafter the licensee will be
able to begin work on the system modification.
Carbon-14 and tritium samplers
commissioned at the Olkiluoto plant units
Continuous-operation carbon-14 and tritium sam-
plers in the off-gas stacks of both units of Olkiluo-
to nuclear power plant have been commissioned.
They improve the monitoring reliability of carbon-
14 and tritium releases into the atmosphere.
Tritium, the heaviest hydrogen isotope, is
formed in the reactor. Tritium generally combines
with a water molecule. Carbon-14, i.e. a radioac-
tive carbon isotope, is also formed in the reactor
core. It mainly combines with carbon dioxide and
certain hydrocarbons. Small amounts of these
beta-active isotopes are measured in gaseous ef-
fluents.
The Olkiluoto plant units used to determine
carbon-14 releases separately, using a calculatory
method based on an earlier measurement cam-
paign. A calculatory method could be used because
carbon-14 formation in the reactor core is steady.
The determination of tritium releases was based
on regular sampling. With new continuous-opera-
tion samplers, release determination is based on
information yielded by an air sample over the
entire sampling period.
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The new equipment collects exhaust air from
the sampling line of the plant unit's exhaust air
stack. To obtain a sample, the exhaust air to be
analysed is circulated through sampling bottles
containing cooled absorption solution. The sam-
ples are analysed in a laboratory for measurement
of their carbon-14 and tritium content.
STUK reviewed design documents concerning
the equipment and their installation and oversaw
the commissioning of the equipment.
The measurement computer systems of
Olkiluoto plant units were renewed
The measurement computer system of Olkiluoto 1
was renewed in the 2000 annual maintenance out-
age. This equipment facilitates the work of the
operating and maintenance personnel in the mon-
itoring and analysis of the course of plant events
as well as makes possible the analysis of data thus
gathered.
The old system has normally been in stand-by
state and has been activated by specific alarm
signals to collect data on important plant parame-
ters during disturbances. The system has also
been used to record plant unit operation during
special events, such as important tests. It has
collected data yielded by more than 200 analogue
and 16 binary signals. The licensee decided to
renew the system's data collection and handling
equipment to enhance system availability and
maintainability.
For measurement data collection the new sys-
tem uses programmable logic processors whose
sampling capacity far exceeds that of the old
system. Data from the processors is transferred to
individual workstations. The data is continuously
gathered and the memory always contains an
entire week's event history. For data analysis,
there is access from the workstations to applicable
analysis software.
The measurement computer system of Olkiluo-
to 2 is due for renewal in 2001.
The system only indirectly affects safety and
the modifications have not been noted to be direct-
ly connected with safety systems. STUK's control
thus mostly pertains to reviewing the description
of the modified system after the modification's
implementation.
4.2.7 Probabilistic safety analyses
Flood risk analysis
STUK has reviewed the flood risk analysis for the
Olkiluoto plant units. The flood risk estimate for
the plant, while in power operation, is ca. 1% of
assessed plant core melt frequency.
Flood risk analysis deals with flood events
internal to the plant during power operation aris-
ing from tank and piping ruptures or component
malfunctions, for example. Flood events internal
to the plant during outages are dealt with in
outage risk analysis, and floods due to external
events are included in weather risk analysis.
Apart from system failures arising from a
flood-initiating event, the spreading of flooding to
several subsystems important to safety is also a
factor critical to the reliability of flood risk analy-
sis. The most significant rooms important to safe-
ty at Olkiluoto facility are pump those located in
the auxiliary building since the cooling systems
needed in the removal of reactor decay heat are
located in the auxiliary buildings. Flood events in
the auxiliary buildings contribute to ca. 84% of the
flood risk estimate.
No modifications have been implemented at
the Olkiluoto facility on the basis of flood risk
analysis so far because flood risk is small accord-
ing to the licensee. The estimates made by STUK
support this view.
4.2.8 Radiation safety
The radiation doses of those who worked at
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in 2000 were below
the annual limit of 50 mSv. The distribution of
individual doses in 2000 is given in Table II. The
highest individual dose at Olkiluoto nuclear pow-
er plant was 14.9 mSv. It has been received while
working at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 during their annual
maintenance outages. The highest individual dose
during the Olkiluoto 1 annual maintenance out-
age was 11.4 mSv and during that of Olkiluoto 2 it
was 11.9 mSv. No individual dose exceeded the
100 mSv dose limit applied to any 5-year period.
The collective occupational exposure in 2000
was 1.72 manSv. Collective occupational dose over
the past years is given in Fig. 16. It mainly
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accumulates in outage work. The collective radia-
tion dose was 0.87 manSv during the Olkiluoto 1
annual maintenance outage and 0.67 manSv dur-
ing that of Olkiluoto 2. Fig. 17 gives the collective
occupational dose incurred in the annual mainte-
nance outages of the Olkiluoto plant units. STUK
guidelines state that the threshold for one plant
unit's collective dose is 2.10 manSv, averaged over
two successive years. In 1999 the collective occu-
pational dose was 0.49 manSv at Olkiluoto 1 and
0.45 manSv at Olkiluoto 2.
Radioactive releases into the environment from
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in 2000 were well
below authorised limits. The releases of gaseous
radioactive effluents were 0.002% and iodine re-
leases 0.07% of authorised limits. The total activi-
ty of liquid effluents was 1.0 GBq, i.e. ca. 6% of the
release limit. The total activity of other liquid
effluents was 1.1%, which is ca. 0.4% of the plant-
specific release limit. Measured radioactive re-
leases are given in Table III.
The radiation dose calculated for the most
exposed individual in the environment of the
plant on the basis of releases was ca. 0.08% of a
limit (100 µSv) that has been established by a
Council of State decision
Environmental radiation monitoring around a
nuclear power plant comprises on- and offsite
measurements as well as determination of radio-
active substances to establish the population radi-
ation exposure and the amount of radioactive
substances present in the environment.
In the environment of Olkiluoto nuclear power
plant, 295 samples were analysed in accordance
with a monitoring programme. Radioactive sub-
stances originating in Olkiluoto plant were meas-
urable in two samples of deposition, one sample of
deposited material, one sample of lichen, two
samples of bottom fauna, one sea water sample
and 16 samples of aquatic plants and 15 samples
of sinking matter. Cobalt-60 was a dominating
radionuclide, originating in the plant, measured
in all of the aforementioned samples, except for
the sample of deposited material. The total
number of observations was 37. The next most
common radionuclide was manganese-54 of which
there were nine observations in aquatic plants. In
three samples of aquatic plants, also another
radioactive cobalt isotope, cobalt-58, was detected.
An elevated tritium concentration was observed in
one sample of deposited material and in one
sample of sea water.
 All the detected concentrations were low and
had no bearing of radiation exposure.
In addition, 12 measurements were made to
verify external radiation in the environment of
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant.
4.3 Fifth reactor in planning
Teollisuuden Voima Oy on 15 November submit-
ted to the Council of State an application for a
decision in principle for the construction of a new
nuclear power plant unit. The application is for a
nuclear power plant unit that is either a boiling
water (BWR) or a pressurised water (PWR) type of
light water reactor. The plant unit's output would
be 1000–1600 MW, depending on the plant type.
Plans are to place the new unit either in Loviisa or
Olkiluoto. Teollisuuden Voima Oy has clarified the
technical and economic applicability to the Finn-
ish circumstances of the six different plant alter-
natives listed in Table IV.
The Ministry of Trade and Industry requested
from STUK a preliminary safety assessment of
the application for the decision in principle. STUK
had prepared for the issuance of the safety assess-
ment by discussing with Teollisuuden Voima Oy
and the plant suppliers the types of light water
reactor available and how they would meet Finn-
Table IV. Options for the new reactor.
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ish safety requirements. During the talks certain
requirements in the Finnish regulatory guides,
written down in fairly general terms, were made
technically more detailed.
4.4 Other nuclear facilities
STUK regulates also the FiR 1 research reactor
operated by the Technical Research Centre of Fin-
land (VTT). The reactor is located in Otaniemi,
Espoo, and its maximum thermal power is 250
kW. The reactor is used for fabrication of radioac-
tive tracers, activation analysis, student training
and treatment of brain tumours by neutron irradi-
ation (BNCT, Boron Neutron Capture Therapy).
STUK’s regulatory work is focused on the reac-
tor's QA, operation, radiation protection, radioac-
tive releases, fire protection, emergency prepared-
ness, physical protection and safeguards, among
others. Out of the proposal of VTT Chemical
Technology, STUK in March 2000 approved new
operators for the reactor. No significant problems
were observed in its operation in 2000. Occupa-
tional radiation doses and radioactive releases
into the environment were clearly below set lim-
its.
The performance figures of the BNCT irradia-
tion unit of the reactor are good. However, in 2000
the FiR 1's operating organisation begun an inves-
tigation into a power uprate test to improve the
performance figures and submitted to the Minis-
try of Trade and Industry a report on the licensing
arrangements of a power uprate test. STUK has
followed the power uprating project and handled
certain safety questions related to it.
The regulation of nuclear facilities relating to
nuclear waste management, e.g. storage space,
are discussed in chapter 5.
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5.1 Spent nuclear fuel
STUK monitored the storage of spent nuclear fuel
by regular inspections and by reviewing plans and
witnessing work pertaining to storage equipment.
No storage-related events occurred that would
have endangered safety. The yearly volumes of
spent fuel stored onsite are given in Figure 19.
Work on an extension to a pool storage for
spent nuclear fuel was completed at Loviisa nucle-
ar power plant. Owing to the new storage exten-
sion, the intermediate storage capacity onsite
Loviisa plant increased to 610 tU. The storage
extension will be subject to regular periodic in-
spections by STUK.
5 NUCLEAR WASTE REGULATION
Posiva Oy, a company owned by Fortum Power
and Heat Oy and Teollisuuden Voima Oy, carries
out R&D and planning into spent fuel disposal
and prepares for implementation at a later date.
The company in May 1999 submitted an applica-
tion for a decision in principle about the construc-
tion of a final disposal facility in Olkiluoto, ap-
proved by the Council of State in December 2000.
In January 2000 STUK presented to the Ministry
of Trade and Industry a preliminary safety ap-
praisal on the application for the decision in
principle.
Further main objects in the final disposal
project are to start facility construction in early
2010 and to commission it in early 2020. During
Fig 19. The volume of spent nuclear fuel on plant sites at the end of the year.
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the next 10 years, Posiva plans to implement an
extensive research, development and design pro-
gramme to assure site suitability and to obtain
research data ensuring safe final disposal. The
research programme includes the construction of
an underground research facility in Olkiluoto.
The focusing of research activities on one final
disposal site means STUK's regulatory effort in
this field will be stepped up. Posiva's research
reports and bedrock investigations in Olkiluoto in
particular have been followed in more detail than
before. In a statement about the nuclear waste
management programme of the licensees STUK
gave its opinion about the R&D needs in the
period between a possible decision in principle
and an application for a construction licence. In
addition, STUK completed a framework plan on
nuclear waste research that supports the regula-
tory effort. STUK audited Posiva's quality system
in 2000 and made some remarks to develop it.
5.2 Reactor waste
Fortum Power and Heat Oy plans to build on the
site of Loviisa nuclear power plant a solidification
facility for medium level waste, since the plant’s
onsite storages for liquid waste are nearly filled to
capacity. A Preliminary Safety Analysis Report for
the facility was submitted to STUK for review,
which was completed by the end of the year.
During reactor waste handling and storage
inspections, STUK made remarks on the safety
classification of systems intended for the meas-
urement of i.a. waste activity. An inspection of the
final disposal of reactor waste gave no cause for
remarks.
By STUK’s permission, scrap metal, mainte-
nance waste, waste oil, washing agent and sew-
age-saturated sand from nuclear power plants
were cleared from regulatory control. The licences
issued by STUK are listed in Appendix 3.
No safety-related problems occurred in the
handling, storage and final disposal of reactor
waste. Yearly waste volumes are given in Fig-
ure 20.
5.3 Decommissioning
By virtue of a 1991 decision by the Ministry of
Trade and Industry, decommissioning plans for do-
mestic nuclear power plants are to be maintained
and updated plans are to be reported every five
years. Such plans were last reported in late 1998
and STUK gave a statement about them to the
Ministry in 1999. STUK's statement on the safety
assessment concerning the final disposal of de-
commissioning waste was postponed, however, un-
til a report on it by VTT Energy was available in
early 2000. STUK in its statement considered that
plans for the final disposal of decommissioning
waste from Loviisa power plant could be based on
the kind of policy decision presented in the 1998
decommissioning plan. STUK also made some re-
marks with an eye to the further planning of the
final disposal concept and safety studies.
5.4 Other control activities
STUK gave to the Ministry of Trade and Industry
a statement, as referred to in section 78 of the
Nuclear Energy Decree, about the licensees' nu-
clear waste management measures and plans as
well as a statement, as referred to in section 90 of
the Nuclear Energy Decree, about making finan-
cial provision for the costs of nuclear waste man-
agement. These regular statements assess wheth-
er, in preparing for nuclear waste management,
the licensees have proceeded according to goals
set out by the government. At the same time, pro-
vision made for the future cost of nuclear waste is
being assessed.
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Fig 20. The volume of reactor waste at the end of the year.
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6.1 Safeguards at Finnish nuclear
facilities
Nuclear material safeguards assure the safety of
operations and that nuclear materials are not di-
verted from licensed, peaceful uses and also that
operations comply with current rules and regula-
tions as well as international agreements signed
by Finland.
As regards nuclear power plants, STUK's safe-
guards focused on the import, storage, domestic
transfer and reloading of fuel. The utilities submit
to STUK the necessary annual plans, advance
notices and reports in compliance with safeguards
requirements.
The number of safeguards inspections at Lovii-
sa nuclear power plant in 2000 was 13 and at
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant it was 15. Euratom
participated in 22 of them, using 26 man-days.
The IAEA took part in 15 inspections, using 18
man-days. Both reactor units of Loviisa nuclear
power plant, the fresh fuel storage and the two
spent fuel storages comprise one unit in nuclear
material accounting, i.e. a material balance area.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant has three material
balance areas: Olkiluoto 1, Olkiluoto 2 and a spent
fuel storage.
In addition to the nuclear power plants, minor
amounts of nuclear material can be found at other
facilities. The most significant of these is FiR 1,
the research reactor operated by the VTT. Also the
following are in possession of small amounts of
nuclear materials: the Laboratory of Radiochemis-
try at the Department of Chemistry of the Univer-
sity of Helsinki, VTT Manufacturing Technology,
the Laboratory of Isotope Geology of the Geologi-
cal Survey of Finland and STUK. In 2000 one
inspection was conducted on FiR 1.
Safeguards employs several verification meth-
ods to ascertain that the nuclear materials data
given by the users, such as burn-out and cooling
time, are correct and complete. Even other mat-
ters relating to nuclear safety, ranging from oper-
ational safety to final disposal, can be verified by
measurements. In 2000 STUK verified by NDA
(non-destructive assay) measurement 42 spent
fuel assemblies at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant.
At Loviisa nuclear power plant, 1199 spent fuel
assemblies were verified. At Loviisa plant, the
Scanning-SFAT method, developed by STUK, can
be used that makes possible the verification of ca.
1000 fuel assemblies a day.
International safeguards is implemented by
the IAEA and the Euratom Safeguards Office
(Euratom). IAEA safeguards are based on the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Safeguards
Agreement signed by non-nuclear EU member
states, Euratom and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193).
Euratom safeguards are based on the Euratom
Treaty and Commission Regulation 3227/76 given
by virtue of the Treaty. STUK always takes part in
inspections carried out by international organisa-
tions.
Euratom and the IAEA have agreed on co-
operation in the field of inspections (New Partner-
ship Approach, NPA). At practical level, Euratom
and the IAEA co-operate in the conducting of
inspections in all material balance areas. Euratom
carries out routine inspections at Olkiluoto 1 and
2 but the inspections of the KPA storage, which
are made at the same time, have participants
from both Euratom and the IAEA.
Operation in all material balance areas was in
accordance with manuals approved by STUK, fa-
cilitating the implementation by STUK of the
obligations of international nuclear agreements
signed by Finland. In 1999 Euratom and the IAEA
delivered to STUK 28 Euratom inspection reports
and IAEA reports. According to the reports nation-
al obligations had been fulfilled in compliance
6 NUCLEAR MATERIALS REGULATION
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with INFCIRC/193.
After the disclosure of the Iraqi nuclear weap-
ons programme, the IAEA launched an extensive
programme to strengthen the safeguards system.
Where administration is concerned, the pro-
gramme is based on the Model Protocol Additional
(INFCIRC/540). Finland ratified the Protocol on
30 June 2000 and is thus equipped to implement
safeguards in accordance with it. The Protocol will
simultaneously take effect in all non-nuclear EU
member countries.
6.2 Control of radioactive
materials transport
About 20 000 radioactive packages are transport-
ed in Finland every year. STUK is not aware of
any transport accidents involving radioactive ma-
terials, or of any other safety hazards. The trans-
port of nuclear materials requires a licence grant-
ed by STUK. A prerequisite for the licence is,
among other things, that nuclear liability insur-
ance and sufficient physical protection are in
place. STUK did not grant any new nuclear trans-
port licences in 2000 since those applied for earli-
er were still valid. STUK approved four transport
plans. Three of them were for fresh nuclear fuel
and one was for irradiated fuel rods for research
purposes. STUK approved four package types for
use in Finland. The most important form of nucle-
ar material transport in 2000 was the import of
fresh nuclear fuel (a total of 248 fuel assemblies)
from Germany and Spain for use at the Finnish
nuclear power plants and the export of two leak-
ing fuel rods to Studsvik, Sweden, for examina-
tion.
The importation of radioactive and nuclear
materials is subject to licence. No attempts at
nuclear smuggling were observed at the Finnish
borders in 2000 but a few, obviously inadvertent
cases surfaced.
In 2000 three shipments containing radioactive
material were turned back at the border. One of
them contained scrap metal for industrial use and
two were lumber carriages with a contaminated
metal structure. In addition, minor radioactivity
was detected in two consignments of scrap metal
after their entry in Finland. According to current
usage, consignments cannot be turned back once
they have passed the customs.
Figure 21 gives the yearly number of consign-
ments turned back at the border. Three consign-
ments were turned back at the border in 2000.
The number is smaller than in previous years,
partly because consignors and consignees have,
through training and experience, come to under-
stand the possibility of radioactivity in consign-
ments of scrap metal. Control at the borders has
been enhanced as well.
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Fig 21. The number of consignments containing ra-
dioactive materials turned back at the border.
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IRRT assessment by the IAEA
An IAEA team of experts visited STUK on 13–24
March 2000 to assess the efficiency of STUK's reg-
ulatory effort in ensuring nuclear and radiation
safety. The inspection was commissioned by the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the Min-
istry of Trade and Industry. As a result of the
assessment, recommendations and proposals for
the development of STUK's operations were given.
In addition, the team recorded proven STUK pro-
cedures. A report on the results of the inspection
is available on STUK's Web site.
The team noted i.a. that STUK has no written
policy of action to ensure a consistent line of
action in dealing with factors endangering safety.
According to current usage, action is considered
case by case. It was also noted that STUK's
inspection effort goes deep into detail and that the
inspectors possess a thorough knowledge of the
regulated nuclear facilities. The idea was brought
forth that this could compromise independence of
control.
The team recommended that the periodic in-
spection programme of nuclear power plants, cur-
rently for one year at a time, be revised to cover
several years instead. Unannounced inspections
were also considered necessary. According to cur-
rent usage, all inspection dates are agreed upon
with the licensee and inspection topics are an-
nounced in advance.
The team recommended that STUK be more
involved in the control of R&D relating to the final
disposal of nuclear waste, for example. Legislation
now gives the Ministry of Trade and Ministry
quite a leading role in the matter.
The team considered STUK's regulatory effort
to be of high quality. The effort to continuously
improve quality of operations, and nuclear waste
management arrangements were considered espe-
cially noteworthy. STUK's procedures relating to a
systematic organisation of operations, and a high-
ly developed internal quality system were consid-
ered exemplary.
STUK has taken measures based on the IRRT
team's recommendations.
Co-operation with the IAEA
The IAEA continues revision of its nuclear safety
regulations (NUSS Guides). STUK prepared for
the IAEA several statements on draft guides that
had been requested from Finland (see Appendix
4). On request STUK’s experts participated in the
preparation of the draft guides.
A report on how the obligations of the Interna-
tional Nuclear Safety Convention have been met
is to be submitted every three years, according to
the Convention. The first meeting to evaluate
national reports was in 1999. STUK began prepa-
ration of the next report at the end of 2000.
A representative of STUK in 1998–1999 func-
tioned as an advisor to the director general of the
IAEA in safeguards-related matters. The director
general invited the expert in question to continue
for the period 2000–2001.
Via the nuclear power plant Incident Reporting
System (IRS), maintained by the IAEA and the
OECD/NEA, 73 reports were received. By means
of the system, nuclear power plant operational
events and observations that may give an impulse
to safety improvements at other nuclear power
plants are communicated to participating coun-
tries. STUK is the co-ordinating organisation in
Finland. The reports are stored in a database
(AIRS, Advanced Incident Reporting System) that
contained ca. 2900 event reports at the end of
2000. In Finland, the database is available for use
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by STUK and the licensees. The reports were
assessed by STUK and the licensees. The reports
assessed 2000 did not give any reason for signifi-
cant changes in plant structures or operational
practices at Finnish nuclear power plants.
STUK is a contact organisation in an informa-
tion exchange system maintained by the IAEA for
the events at research reactor facilities (IRSRR,
Incident Reporting System for Research Reac-
tors). The system's operation is in it's early stages
and in 2000 several countries submitted reports
on the previous years' events. Finland reported an
event, “Incorrect procedures during irradiation of
a sample at FiR 1 reactor”, which occurred on 23
September 1994 at the FiR 1 reactor operated by
the Technical Research Centre of Finland.
The IAEA communicated through the INES
information exchange system (INES, Internation-
al Nuclear Event Scale) information on 26 events,
two of which pertained to the assignment of a
final Level to two events in 1999. Events that are
at least Level 2, or above, on the INES Scale or
which are, or may be, of interest internationally
are reported to the IAEA. STUK is the Finnish
contact organisation for the INES system. Of the
events that took place in 2000, 13 occurred at
nuclear power plants. The severest of them was
classified Level 2. An accident assigned to Level 4
(preliminary classification) occurred in Egypt in
June during the handling of a radioactive source.
The source, heavily emitting Ir-192, had fallen
into wrong hands, resulting in the death of two
and the significant exposure to radiation of five
persons. Other events during the use of radiation
or at places other than nuclear power plants
involved losses of radiation sources. They were
mostly classified Level 1. In 2000 Finland submit-
ted no reports to the INES System, however, a
STUK report on a leak of mildly radioactive water
at Loviisa nuclear power plant on 17 August 2000
was disseminated through the INES system after
STUK had submitted it to an IAEA emergency
response unit.
STUK hosted an IAEA-financed 14-day inter-
national course on the use of nuclear power plant
safety assessment as a tool in decision-making.
The course was targeted at nuclear power plant
employees and safety authorities in Eastern Euro-
pean Countries.
In IAEA expert capacity, STUK's representa-
tives participated in the IRRT assessment of nu-
clear safety authorities in the Czech Republic,
Hungary and China. A representative of STUK
has also participated, as an IAEA expert, in train-
ing and assistance given to the Armenian nuclear
safety authority.
Co-operation with the OECD/NEA
International co-operation in nuclear safety re-
search was mostly channelled through the OECD/
NEA. The organisation also facilitated an ex-
change of opinions between authorities about the
need to develop nuclear safety regulations and the
contents of individual regulations. STUK was rep-
resented in all of the organisation’s main commit-
tees:
• Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installa-
tions (CSNI)
• Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities
(CNRA)
• Committee on Radiation Protection and Public
Health (CRPPH)
• Radioactive Waste Management Committee
(RWMC).
A representative from STUK acted as the chair-
man of the CNRA. STUK took part in the work of
working groups set up by the committees as well.
Co-operation with the EU
STUK participated in the work of Atomic Ques-
tions Group (AQG), a working group under the
Council of Ministers of the EU, when it assessed
nuclear safety in the EU applicant countries.
STUK participated in the work of the following
EU working groups: Nuclear Regulators Working
Group (NRWG), European Radioactive Waste Reg-
ulator's Forum (ERWR), European Nuclear Instal-
lations Group (ENIS-G) and the NRWG working
group Safety Critical Software.
In the field of nuclear material safeguards,
STUK participated in the operation of the Europe-
an Safeguards R&D Association (ESARDA). ES-
ARDA’s duty is to promote and harmonise Europe-
an R&D relating to nuclear material control. ES-
ARDA offers a forum for information and ideas
exchange to authorities, researchers and nuclear
power plant operators.
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STUK’s participated in the work of the Com-
mission’s expert group that handles documents
submitted by the member states to fulfil their
obligations under article 37 of the Euratom Trea-
ty. The article obliges all member states to send to
the Commission general information on their radi-
oactive waste disposal plans. This enables the
group to assess whether the implementation of
the plans could lead to the contamination of water,
soil or air within the territory of another member
state.
NKS co-operation
The ongoing Nordic nuclear safety research pro-
gramme (NKS), covers the years 1998–2001. The
main research areas are nuclear safety and radia-
tion protection (SOS), emergency response and en-
vironmental impacts (BOK) and projects dealing
with nuclear threats and dissemination of infor-
mation (SBA); these further divide into seven
projects.
The most important tasks of the SOS pro-
gramme are the assessment of risks and safety
culture in the operation of nuclear power plants as
well as severe accident management. The BOK
programme and the SBA projects partly pertain to
nuclear safety. STUK contributed to the work of
steering groups and various study areas of the
NKS programme.
Bilateral co-operation
A representative from STUK was a permanent
member of the Reactor Safety Committee assist-
ing SKI. A representative of SKI was an invited
expert in the Advisory Committee on Nuclear
Safety that functions in conjunction with STUK.
Co-operation with SKI was continued through
meetings during which current questions of nuclear
power plant regulation were discussed. With the
Swedish radiation safety authority SSI, informa-
tion exchange was continued concerning doses to
Finns who had worked at nuclear power plants in
Sweden and to Swedes who had worked at Finnish
plants. Liaison during emergency situations was
developed in co-operation with SKI and the SSI.
Within the framework of an agreement of co-
operation with the US NRC, a wealth of reports in
written form were exchanged as in previous years.
The most important form of co-operation with
the Belgian nuclear safety authority AIB Vincotte
Nuclear (AVN) was participation in the work of an
international nuclear safety committee that sup-
ports AVN.
Co-operation meetings on PSA and fire studies
were arranged with the French nuclear safety
authority (DSIN).
Co-operation between STUK and the Russian
nuclear safety authority (GAN) in the field of
nuclear material and waste control continued
based on an arrangement signed in 1998.
Safeguards co-operation with the Australian
authority (ASO) continued. In accordance with an
established practice, STUK provided ASO with
information about nuclear materials of Australian
origin imported to and kept in Finland.
A permanent representative from STUK was
nominated to the Advisory Committee on Nuclear
Safety that assists the Lithuanian nuclear safety
authority (VATESI). In addition, STUK's repre-
sentatives participated in the Licensing Assist-
ance Project (LAP) that supports VATESI in li-
censing relating to Ignalina nuclear power plant.
Assistance to Central and Eastern European
safety authorities
STUK continued to participate in assistance given
to radiation and nuclear safety authorities in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe under financing from the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the European Un-
ion as well as through from the IAEA.
In association with other EU countries, STUK
carries out EU programmes to assist the authori-
ties in Lithuania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic,
Ukraine, Hungary and Russia. Earlier programme
phases were completed by 2000. The preparation
of continuation projects aimed at all of these
countries as well as of new projects aimed at
Estonia and Lithuania are awaiting for a decision
by the Commission of the European Communities.
The Commission spent almost all of 2000 in estab-
lishing the final form of a comprehensive policy of
administration that would include nuclear safety
matters and related assistance programmes. At
the beginning of 2001 the Commission is expected
to be fully prepared again for decision-making
pertaining to nuclear safety assistance pro-
grammes.
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With funding for co-operation with the neigh-
bouring areas from the Ministry for Foreign Af-
fairs, bilateral co-operation programmes were
maintained with the nuclear safety authorities of
Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine.
Close contacts were maintained with the resident
inspectors at Leningrad and Kola nuclear power
plants who regularly drew up quarterly reports on
plant events, reporting to STUK the situation at
the plants in question during their visits to Fin-
land. Visitors from the technical support organisa-
tion of the Russian nuclear safety authority were
advised on the making of comparative reactor
analyses by offering training at the Lappeenranta
University of Technology in Finland, in the appli-
cation of a Finnish simulation programme to a
new type of Russian reactor.
In the field of safeguards, there was close co-
operation with Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
and Ukraine. Training offered to boarder control
officers and customs officials as well as equipment
provided for radioactive materials detection helps
reduce the smuggling of radioactive materials.
Enhancement of safety at Easetern
European nuclear facilities
STUK administered Finnish-Russian co-operation
in the field of radiation and nuclear safety, funded
from the Finnish government’s budget for co-oper-
ation in neighbouring areas. Kola and Leningrad
nuclear power plants as well as various radioac-
tive waste storages are the objects of co-operation.
STUK plans the projects together with the recipi-
ents, invites offers and participates in project con-
trol. In addition to work carried out by consult-
ants, STUK’s experts actively participate in the
making of safety improvements at the plants in
question.
These projects continue a long-term pro-
gramme that emphasises quality of plant opera-
tions, fire safety and the integrity of safety-rele-
vant piping as well emergency response and envi-
ronmental radiation monitoring.
Further information on the projects can be
found in the report “Finnish Support Programme
for Nuclear Safety, Annual Summary 2000 (STUK
2001)”.
STUK’s representatives worked in expert
groups of the EU and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which
assessed the appropriateness of some nuclear
safety improvement projects for which financing
has been sought.
STUK worked in a team of experts (Contact
Experts Group, CEG) co-ordinating international
projects to improve nuclear waste management in
Russia; it participated in the meetings and work-
ing groups of CEG as well as in its assessment
and consultation work. One major CEG meeting
was arranged in Finland. In direct bilateral co-
operation with GAN and the Radon combine,
STUK continued implementation of programmes
to exchange nuclear waste management informa-
tion and experience. STUK organised for Russian
authorities various training events pertaining to
nuclear waste and western technology. The specif-
ic aim of multilateral international co-operation
was to make the assisting countries better in-
formed of one another's nuclear waste projects.
Finland participated in an international project
to develop a mobile storage cask for naval radioac-
tive waste for use on the Kola Peninsula. The cask
will be a prototype that meets modern safety
requirements.
STUK participated in the work of the PIERG
(Paldiski International Expert Reference Group)
which supports the decommissioning of the nucle-
ar reactors at Paldiski in Estonia and the han-
dling of radioactive waste. Finland assisted the
Estonian radiation safety authority by way of
bilateral co-operation.
Radiation monitoring in the environment of
Leningrad nuclear power plant was enhanced by
the installation of additional automatic measure-
ment stations. The network now comprises 25
measurement stations, making possible a nearly
real-time monitoring of data by STUK. A corre-
sponding system is being developed for Kola nu-
clear power plant. For the radiation monitoring
network in the environment of Kola nuclear power
plant, 15 automatic measurement stations have
been installed and commissioned.
The transmission equipment for a satellite-
based accident announcement system was re-
newed at Leningrad nuclear power plant. Both
Leningrad and Kola nuclear power plants have
this system available for use by the nuclear safety
authority, making it possible to quickly relay a
notification of an event or accident to STUK.
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STUK co-operated with an emergency centre in
St Petersburg subordinate to the Russian minis-
try of energy. In 2000 STUK participated i.a. in
the procurement of a ventilation system for the
emergency centre's new premises.
In the field of safeguards, there was close co-
operation with Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
and Ukraine. The training and equipment provid-
ed by STUK aim at preventing radioactive materi-
als smuggling.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treat
(CTBT)
Finland ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty on 15 January 1999. In Finland STUK
was given the duties of a National Data Centre,
i.e. a responsibility for the verification obligations
of the treaty binding the national authority, the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and for those binding
the international authority, i.e. the nuclear test
ban organisation (the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty Organization, CTBTO). The Na-
tional Data Centre officially opened on 4 October
1999.
In 2000 the Centre participated in the setting
up of an international verification system. Its own
operation capabilities were developed: secure data
communications and an automatic analysis sys-
tem were completed. In addition, a description of
the Centre's activities was completed. The Centre
provided training to personnel from Nordic radia-
tion monitoring stations.
Other forms of co-operation
STUK was active in the work of the Western Eu-
ropean Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA).
WENRA is a body of mutual co-operation set up by
the nuclear safety authorities of Western Europe.
In 2000 WENRA published a second report on nu-
clear safety in the EU membership applicant coun-
tries. Co-operation continued to establish a com-
mon European safety approach in the fields of
both reactor safety and nuclear waste manage-
ment.
STUK continued to contribute to NERS work
(Network of Regulators of Countries with Small
Nuclear Programmes) and hosted a NERS meet-
ing in 2000. NERS is a body of co-operation set up
by the safety authorities of countries with small-
scale nuclear programmes. The authorities of the
Argentine, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland,
Hungary, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, South
Africa and Switzerland are contributors to its
work. NERS exchanges experiences and ideas on
how authorities with small organisations could
handle their duties appropriately and efficiently.
Possible mutual assistance in regulatory control
issues is discussed as well.
STUK has contributed to the VVER Forum, a
form of co-operation among countries operating
VVER-type nuclear power plants. Other partici-
pants were Armenia, Bulgaria, the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine. Oper-
ating experiences from and safety improvements
to VVER-type plants are discussed and experience
exchanged. The VVER Forum held one meeting in
2000. It has launched a joint project into the
service life management of components and build-
ings of VVER-type plants. It aims at promoting
exchange of information on facility service life
management among authorities regulating VVER
plants as well as to drawing up recommendations
for development of regulatory requirements per-
taining to service life management. An inspector
from STUK participated in the working group's
start-up meeting in Kiova.
STUK participated in the preparatory meeting
of the DOCUM project launched by the Loviisa
Energy Centre. The project aims to develop nor-
mative documentation on lifetime management of
Russian VVER plants in co-operation with the
Russian International Nuclear Safety Center
(RINSC) of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry
(MINATOM) and the Russian nuclear safety au-
thority (GAN).
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A. Safety management
• Definition, maintenance and development of
safety culture
• Quality management
• Verification of fulfilment of safety regulations
• Co-operation with authorities
B. Main functions
• Methods employed in working processes and
their functionality
• Interfaces between the various stages of work-
ing processes
• Feedback contained in the functions and their
utilisation
• Support functions, such as training, quality
assurance and document administration, relat-
ing to the main function under inspection
B.1. Safety assessment and improvement
• Responding to changing safety requirements
• Utilisation of safety research
• Utilisation of operating experience feedback in
safety assessment and development
• Modification process and its functionality
B.2. Operations
• Operation
• Supervision of operations
• Management of operational disturbances
• Periodic tests
B.3. Plant maintenance
• Maintenance
• Service life management
• Annual maintenance management
• Procurement
• Administrative work control
C. Inspections by functional unit and field
of know-how
C.1. Plant safety functions
C.2. Electrical and I & C systems
C.3. Mechanical engineering
C.4. Construction engineering and structural
engineering
C.5. PSA and utilisation of fault statistics
C.6. Information management
C.7. Chemistry
C.8. Nuclear waste
C.9. Radiation protection
C.10. Fire protection
C.11. Emergency preparedness
C.12. Physical protection
C.13. Training
C.14. Quality assurance
PERIODIC INSPECTION PROGRAMME APPENDIX 1
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• Updates of safety documents
• Competence of personnel
• Abnormal events
• Outage planning and execution
• Reactor reloads
• Conduct and results of inservice inspections
• Inservice examinations of pressure equipment
APPENDIX 2 TOPICAL INSPECTIONS
• Modifications, repairs and preventive mainte-
nance
• Post-outage plant start-up
• Nuclear fuel procurement
• Nuclear material safeguards
• Nuclear waste cleared from regulatory control
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Licences and approvals in accordance with
the Nuclear Energy Act
• C214/219, 16 November 2000,
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Exportation of two irradiated nuclear fuel rods
to Studsvik, Sweden, for examination. Max. 30
g of plutonium and 4 kg of enriched uranium.
Valid until 31 December 2000.
• C821/68, 17 November 2000,
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
The handing over to Ekokem Oy of a 9m3 batch
of waste oil to be cleared from regulatory con-
trol. The oil is from Olkiluoto nuclear power
plant and will be used for saw chain oil. Valid
until 31 December 2001.
Decisions to implement YVL Guides
• 17/001/99, 15 February 2000,
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Guide YVL 1.10, Requirements for the siting of
nuclear power plants
• 17/001/99, 15 February 2000,
Fortum Power and Heat Oy
Guide YVL 1.10, Requirements for the siting of
nuclear power plants
• 7/001/98, 23 March 2000,
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Guide YVL 1.14, Mechanical equipment and
structures of nuclear facilities. Control of manu-
facturing.
• 7/001/98, 23 March 2000,
Fortum Power and Heat Oy
Guide YVL 1.14, Mechanical equipment and
structures of nuclear facilities. Control of manu-
facturing.
• 3/001/97, 30 March 2000,
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Guide YVL 6.9, The national system of account-
ing for and control of nuclear material.
• 3/001/97, 30 March 2000,
Fortum Power and Heat Oy
Guide YVL 6.9, The national system of account-
ing for and control of nuclear material.
• 3/001/97, 30 March 2000,
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Guide YVL 6.10, Reports to be submitted on
nuclear materials
• 3/001/97, 30 March 2000,
Fortum Power and Heat Oy
Guide YVL 6.10, Reports to be submitted on
nuclear materials
• 4/001/98, 27 April 2000,
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Guide YVL 4.3, Fire protection at nuclear power
plants
• 4/001/98, 27 April 2000,
Fortum Power and Heat Oy
Guide YVL 4.3, Fire protection at nuclear power
plants
LICENCES AND APPROVALS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUCLEAR ENERGY ACT, APPENDIX 3
AND DECISIONS TO IMPLEMENT YVL GUIDES
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• 1/001/97, 28 April 2000,
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Guide YVL 6.2, Design bases and general de-
sign criteria for nuclear fuel
• 1/001/97, 28 April 2000,
Fortum Power and Heat Oy
Guide YVL 6.2, Design bases and general de-
sign criteria for nuclear fuel
• 16/001/99, 27 September 2000,
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Guide YVL 1.16, Control of nuclear liability
insurance policies
• 16/001/99, 27 September 2000,
Fortum Power and Heat Oy
Guide YVL 1.16, Control of nuclear liability
insurance policies
• 10/001/99, 27 December 2000,
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Guide YVL 2.1, Nuclear power plant systems,
structures and components and their safety
classification
• 10/001/99, 27 December 2000,
Fortum Power and Heat Oy
Guide YVl 2.1, Nuclear power plant systems,
structures and components and their safety
classification.
APPENDIX 3 LICENCES AND APPROVALS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUCLEAR ENERGY ACT,
AND DECISIONS TO IMPLEMENT YVL GUIDES
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STATEMENTS AND DECISIONS PERTAINING TO APPENDIX 4
PERSONNEL OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
Statements
• Y811/29, 12 January 2000
A preliminary safety evaluation submitted by
STUK to the Ministry of Trade and Industry
pertaining to the application by Posiva Oy for a
decision in principle on a nuclear fuel repository
• 2 February 2000
OECD/NEA/CNRA questionnaire on plant up-
grading and life extension; Finnish response.
• Y811/23, 4 February 2000
A statement to the Ministry of Trade and Indus-
try about the licensees' waste management pro-
gramme for 2000
• 2/000/00, 13 April 2000
A statement to the Ministry of Trade and Indus-
try about a Council of State decree to modify the
Nuclear Energy Decree
• 4/750/00, 27 April 2000
A statement to the IAEA about the Safety Guide
Draft “Organisation and staffing of the regula-
tory body for nuclear facilities”
• 4/750/00, 27 April 2000
A statement to the IAEA about the Safety Guide
Draft “Regulatory inspection of nuclear facili-
ties and enforcement by the regulatory body”
• 4/750/00, 27 April 2000
A statement to the IAEA about the Safety Guide
Draft “Review and assessment by the regulato-
ry body for nuclear facilities”
• 4/750/00, 27 April 2000
A statement to the IAEA on the Safety Guide
Draft “Documentation produced and required in
regulating nuclear facilities”
• A814/8, 12 June 2000
A statement to the Ministry of Trade and Indus-
try on the commissioning of Loviisa facility, an
assessment of the safety of the final disposal of
decommissioning waste
• 26/750/00, 30 June 2000
A statement to the IAEA about the Safety Guide
Draft “Dispersion of radioactive material in air
and water and consideration of population dis-
tribution in site evaluation for nuclear power
plants”
• 25/750/00, 24 July 2000
A statement to the IAEA about the Safety Guide
Draft “Maintenance, surveillance and inservice
inspection in nuclear power plants”
• Y214/48, 3 September 2000
A statement to the Ministry of Trade and Indus-
try about VTT Chemistry's application for the
exports of thorium-containing pyrochlorine con-
centrate
• C812/27, 18 October 2000
A statement to the Ministry of Trade and Indus-
try about the financial provision for nuclear
waste management made by Teollisuuden Voi-
ma Oy
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• A812/26, 19 October 2000
A statement to the Ministry of Trade and Indus-
try about the financial provision for nuclear
waste management made by Fortum Power and
Heat Oy
• 35/750/00, 23 October 2000
A statement to the IAEA about the Safety Guide
Draft “Safety of nuclear power plants. Opera-
tion: Core management and fuel handling”
• F812/21, 11 December 2000
A statement to the Ministry of Trade and Indus-
try about the financial provision made by VTT
for the management of nuclear waste generated
by the research reactor FiR 1
Decisions pertaining to personnel of nuclear
power plants
• F113/8, 8 February 2000
On the application of VTT Chemistry, new oper-
ators have been approved for the FiR 1 research
reactor, expiry date 31 December 2002.
• A113/100, 23 February 2000; A113/102, 26 April
2000; A113/104, 30 October 2000; A113/105, 20
December 2000
On the application of Fortum Power and Heat
Oy, individuals employed by the applicant have
been approved as shift managers or operators
• C113/164, 16 February 2000; C113/165, 24
March 2000; C113/166, 31 March 2000; C113/
167, 15 May 2000; C113/170, 26 October 2000
On the application of Teollisuuden Voima Oy,
individuals employed by the applicant have
been approved as shift managers or operators
APPENDIX 4 STATEMENTS AND DECISIONS PERTAINING TO
PERSONNEL OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
• T121-2/8, 25 April 2000
On the application of Teollisuuden Voima Oy,
individuals employed by Teollisuuden Voima
Oy, Inspecta Oy and Huber Testing Oy have
been approved to perform structural inspec-
tions of OL1/OL2 nuclear power plant compo-
nents and structures.
• C114/23, 12 June 2000
On the application of Teollisuuden Voima Oy,
Mr Esa Unga, M.Sc. (Tech), has been approved
a second substitute responsible manager, as
referred to in section 79 of the Nuclear Energy
Act (990/1987) and in sections 122–127 of the
Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988), at Olkiluoto
nuclear power plant.
• A114/17, 4 July 2000
On the application of Fortum Power and Heat
Oy, Mr Markku Tiitinen, M.Sc (Tech), has been
approved a second substitute responsible man-
ager, as referred to in section 79 of the Nuclear
Energy Act (990/1987) and in sections 122–127
of the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988), at
Loviisa nuclear power plant.
• T121-1/29, 27 July 2000
On the application of Fortum Power and Heat
Oy, individuals employed by the applicant have
been approved to perform structural, operation-
al and periodic inspections on mechanical equip-
ment and structures at Lo1/Lo2 nuclear facili-
ties as well as to perform commissioning inspec-
tions of electrical and I & C systems after
repairs and modifications.
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Nuclear power plant safety
Application of the Monte Carlo technique to com-
plex geometries
The TRAB-PLIM computer code; verification of
the TRAB-3D code
The HEXTRAN-PLIM computer code; completion
of the code using a primary circuit model based on
the PLIM solution method
Evaluation of the characteristics and applicability
of importance measures for use in risk-informed
regulatory control of nuclear power plants
Development of NDT systems qualification; Quali-
fication variables
FNNUS/AGE/FUELI—fuel cladding corrosion
mechanism and its modelling, year 1999
FINNUS/AGE/OXI—Modelling of oxide film be-
haviour and its significance for activity build-up
and various corrosion phenomena in nuclear pow-
er plants
FINNUS/AGE/ENVI—environmental stress in-
duced rupturing of nuclear power plant materials,
year 1999
Development of fuel analysis facilities by utilisa-
tion of the FRAPCON-3/FRAPTRAN software
package
Safety culture in practice
A cable fire model for a room; completion of the
model
Studies in concrete technology for the construc-
tion, inspection and repair of bridges and nuclear
power plant structures; studies 1999
Review of Loviisa level 2 PSA
Development and qualification of the SCANAIR
programme
Development of NDT system qualification; qualifi-
cation body documents
Development of NDT system qualification; qualifi-
cation level documents
The effect of fuel burn-up on safety
Generation of organic iodine during severe acci-
dents; paint experiments
Gathering of data via the meteorological towers of
Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants and
data handling by the Finnish Meteorological Insti-
tute; a continuation project
Analysis of the Multiverter frequency converters
Modelling of fire situations for use in fire-PSA
The effect of smoke and heat on electronic equip-
ment
An agreement to implement the PALOTUB fire
safety project in 1997–98
Licensing of a programmable automation system
Licensing of a programmable automation system;
Operating experience analysis
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Analysis and combining of deterministic and prob-
abilistic data for use as a basis for decision-mak-
ing; Development and application of a multiple
criteria decision model as part of a decision panel
Development of NDT system qualification; Co-op-
eration in the qualification of NDT systems in Fin-
land. Review of TVO/Siemens qualification docu-
ments; 16 October 2000
Nuclear waste management
Assessment of the characterisation of VLJ waste
from Olkiluoto
Review of a safety analysis for final disposal of
decommissioning waste from Loviisa facility
Palmottu natural analogue project; redox process-
es and migration 1999
Palmottu natural analogue project; geochemical
evaluation 1999
Palmottu natural analogue project; performance
assessment studies 1999
Radiation dose estimates from radionuclides re-
leased in mines
Geochemical barriers in nuclear waste repositor-
ies; the behaviour of high-FeO olivine rock and
sorption mechanism of uranium
Groundwater flow paths; fractured rock observa-
tions from rock cuts
Natural geochemical concentrations and fluxes on
the Baltic Shield in Finland as indicators of nucle-
ar waste repository safety
Review of possible safeguards verification meth-
ods for final disposal of nuclear fuel
Calculational modelling of the mechanical and
physical phenomena of final disposal in safety as-
sessments
Uranium series research in the assessment of
long-term safety
Modelling of the glacial loading
Electric and electrochemical properties of surface
films formed on copper in the presence of chloride
anions in groundwater
Presence and character study of fractured rock
zones in a final repository environment
